

INTERNATIONAL
HUMANIST AND
ETHICAL UNION

HUMANISM

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1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTION

The word "humanism" is of recent date. The Bavarian pedagogue F. J. Niethammer, a friend of Schiller, formed it in 1808 in his publication *Der Streit des Philanthropismus und des Humanismus in der Theorie des Erziehungsunterrichts unserer Zeit*; the adjective humanistic was already in use. Originally the word "humanism" exclusively denoted an educational system that considered the study of classical languages and history the best education for complete humanity. This meaning it still had when in 1859 Georg Voigt published his *Die Wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums oder das erste Jahrhundert des Humanismus*. Apart from this the word "humanism", however, gets the meaning of a certain attitude of mind in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Shortly after 1860 when Burckhard published his *Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* this meaning seems to have already obtained civil rights in scientific usage. Since then the term "humanism" gets a wider and wider application in the Western languages as denoting a view of life which centres in man. The notion itself denoted by that term is, however, much older. The following sketch is intended to trace the term humanism in its most essential meaning by the historical elaboration of a humanistic picture of man and the world, rather than the development of scientific thought.

Antiquity

In the school of the physician Hippocrates the conception of human nature is probably for the first time distinguished from nature as a whole; it then has reference to all functions of man as a unity of body and soul. But the sophists, particularly Protagoras, already limited the conception mainly to the field of the spirit. Unmistakably Socrates's words "know thyself" refer to this new meaning. When Socrates assumes to know nothing this means in the first place an appeal to reflection on man's own nature, free from traditional judgements and all heteronomous notions of man and the world. Thus he makes room for an autonomous conception of human nature which, as regards himself, appears to be dominated by obedience to an inner voice: the socratic *daimónion*. In his track this answer is given by various Greek thinkers, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, in different ways but in corresponding spirit: the real human nature reveals itself in that by which man transcends the animal, when led by the *lógos*, he fulfils his proper and inscrutable *aretê* and bridles his passions without ignoring them. On this foundation grows an all-embracing educational system: the

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Greek *paideía*. Later on the word *anthrôpismos* appears in Greek philosophy as a counterpart of Latin *humanitas*. With Panaitios it is the aim of the *paideía* and the opposite of *cynismos*.

At a certain stage of development this view of life had a great influence on Roman culture also. The effect of it we find in the circle of Scipio Africanus Minor and especially in the writings of Cicero. As a result of the meeting between Roman culture and Greek spirit, from the second century before Christ the idea of *humanitas* develops in the soil of an age-old tradition amongst the Roman nobility. This *humanitas* means not only mildness of mind, tactful social intercourse and respect for people and relations between them, but also a sense of gladness and festivity, by which a refined way of living distinguishes itself from culturelessness.

Do not, however, take this attitude towards life in the outward sense; the basis of it is *pietas*, the humility by which man comes to stand in the right relation with everybody and everything. This means that man overcomes the all-too-human so that he unfolds in himself the truly human. This is a conquest of the purely biological. But it is also a liberation from the daily rut by recreation. Hence the study of literature is held to be the most human and the most freeing recreation of the mind, and those are truly to be deemed men who owing to their true practising of culture may be called citizens of humanity.

In the latter Stoa we find both Greek *paideía* and Roman *humanitas*, but widened and deepened to a bond embracing all men and bedded in a cosmic notion of life. Epictetus recognizes the same nature in all men; Seneca discovers humanity in Roman and barbarian, in king and slave. It is a period of extreme syncretism, an amalgamation of Eastern, Jewish and classical elements of culture, of magical, mythical, theocratic, rationalistic, and ethical parts.

Middle Ages and Renaissance

In this world Christianity arose, and it need not surprise anyone that the new faith was influenced by the old world. Once it existed there was no lack of attempts to bring about a synthesis between hellenic culture and Jewish-Christian faith. The Gospel of John is permeated with classical forms of thought. In general, early Christianity looked upon the cultivation of human nature with much more favour than is usually supposed, though, naturally, it substituted a theocratic for an anthropocentric conception. Ambrose wrote a manual for priests under the same title and with partly the same contents as Cicero's *De Officiis*, and some of the great fathers of the church, amongst them Basil, expressly demand human perfection.

In a certain sense this process continued during the middle ages. Not without reason a Carolingian renaissance and a renaissance of the tenth century are spoken of. In the twelfth century the work of

Aristotle penetrates via the Arabian world into Christian culture. That does not alter the fact that mediæval thought shows typical features of a contempt of nature that matched a conception of life and the world mainly directed towards the hereafter, as well as of a belittlement of *humanitas* against the background of an overwhelming *deitas*. But after the twelfth century we again see in medical circles the growth of scientific thought on man, inspired by natural science. The Arabian thinker Averroes develops a doctrine in which man is fully understood as a natural being living without an immortal soul in a senseless world, caught in the cycle of eternal repetition, but in which at the same time is recognized the unassailable truth of the religious dogma which places man with an immortal soul in a world that leads up to the Kingdom of God: the doctrine of the double truth, in other words.

Of course this teaching was condemned as heresy by the Catholic Church. The official philosophy, scholasticism, called to arms all her forces to combat Averroism, without, however, succeeding in defeating it decisively. Not even when it obtained the help, not much appreciated at first, of Thomas Aquinas. The strong point in the position of Thomas against the Averroists is that he leaves natural reason its rights, the weak point that he at the same time makes philosophy what has been called the maidservant of theology. But now a third ally enters the lists against Averroism. With the Averroists this movement fully admitted natural experience but, exactly as a consequence thereof, laid all stress on the entirely specific nature of man as a spiritual being. This was possible because in this movement the fertilizing influence of the classical spirit manifested itself once again: the movement represented a renaissance of the Græco-Roman conception of man, the renaissance of the *humanitas* of antiquity. The rediscovery of Cicero, which for Petrarca especially was still an æsthetical experience, became an essential element in the history of Western culture. People began to realize the possibility of thinking independently of Christianity, on the specific nature of man, though this certainly did not mean that they let Christianity go. Neither does this way of thinking deny the bond between man and nature, but at the same time it puts forward the thought that in man something manifests itself that is not found in the same way elsewhere in nature, viz., his soul and his spirit. It mostly considers man as an image of God with an entirely specific value, which he can and should unfold. Consequently this way of thinking is at the same time anti-dogmatic and anti-naturalistic and makes a stand against both scholasticism and Averroism.

Characteristic in this new movement is Cusanus. His position was: there is a philosophical cleft between God and the world. That means: man cannot know God by means of his intellect and is cast upon his intellectual love of God under the standard of the good. This is "knowing ignorance", for, however much he knows the things of this

world, man is ignorant of their first cause: God. But also "ignorant knowledge", for, however ignorant of the essence of the world, man can know things in their temporality. There is no limit to the study of reality, that is the true sense of the *studia humaniora*. But if we can know God only by spiritual beholding it must also be admitted that each sincere approach has the same relative right; this is the foundation of Cusanus's idea of tolerance.

In this way of thinking the conceptions of God and religion can no longer be decisive for the valuation of man. Again man is discovered and accepted in his specific nature; and this acceptance of man provides the psychological basis of the acceptance of the world. Man may be a human God, a human angel... or a human beast. In this regard all men are equal; they must all make the choice. But only those are really free that live under the law, that is to say, in obedience to the idea of spiritual and moral values which are known to us by reason. This is the sphere in which the idea of human dignity is for the first time in history explicitly expressed. For the humanists of that period the excessive and normless individualism of the Renaissance is in no way representative; it is no more than an extreme phenomenon accompanying the new reflection on human nature. But the main stream runs via the Florentine humanists to a figure like Erasmus, who lays all stress on the demands of practical morality expressed in the Sermon on the Mount. These demands inspired him with a passionate urge towards pacifism and tolerance, which originates in respect for spiritual life.

At the time of the Renaissance the humanists seldom cut entirely the ties with Christianity. Certainly, however, there were some conscious atheists among them; remember the curious and brave figure, Giordano Bruno. But the main stream of *renaissance-humanitas* has its bedding within Christianity, in spite of the critical impartiality and the sense of textual criticism that reaches its zenith in Erasmus. It is true that religion itself had changed its character: instead of a religion of authority, it had become a religion of conscience; instead of a religion of fear, a religion of love. And the inspiration for this change the humanists drew from the human wisdom of the classics.

In the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries continually ideas of reform, renewal, and renaissance were in the air and provided the climate of a new inspiration for men and the world. With the Reformation and counter-Reformation, however, this impetus is lost. In the controversy between Luther and Erasmus is manifested for the first time in all clarity the problem that dominates further development: the polarity of (reformatory) Christianity and (autonomous) Humanism. Later also one still finds all kinds of biblical humanism, humanistic Christianity and Catholic humanity; but Augsburg and Trent opened an abyss between humanistic inspiration and biblical revelation.

Modern Times

At the end of the period to which the name Renaissance can be applied, a stagnation sets in in the field of *humanitas*. In a spiritual respect the seventeenth century is the time of the great systems that easily find their places in a dogmatic world. Even in the system of Spinoza, however revolutionary and heretical, the typical humanistic sense, the originality of human development, the inspiration of liberty, are lacking. The year 1685 brings the repeal of the decree of Nantes, in appearance the extreme deed of power of victorious absolutism, in fact a termination. Up to that time every Frenchman thought as Bossuet, the apostle of the divine right of kings; since then every Frenchman has thought as Voltaire — that is a revolution! Thus the French historian Hazard wittily describes this development. How did it come about? Under the influence i.a. of travel-stories the thought of the relativity of social and cultural achievements becomes evident at the end of the seventeenth century. A certain naturalistic deism undermines the dogmatic belief in revelation.

In England in the meantime the empirical method has been inaugurated. Bacon summons man to establish the power of the human race over the world by means of analysis of reality. In 1713 appeared Collins' *Discourse of Free Thinking*. Locke designs a philosophy on the foundation of experience, in which the happiness of all is the purpose of human striving. Critical thinking is more and more recognized as the final test of truth. But let it be added immediately that wherever this claim is made, the knowledge of good and evil is considered as belonging to the essence of free-thinking man. The eighteenth century was thus announced: the period of belief in progress, of lighting up the darkness by the light of reason, but also of the passionate respect for human dignity. To use Hazard's words once more: "All is ready, Voltaire can come."

Yet not aggressive Voltaire but, rather, constructive Diderot continues proper humanistic tradition; but the latter was not less combative as regards prejudice and half-heartedness, which he saw embodied in the religious tradition and a more or less superficial deism; combative also as regards barren intellectuality and normless libertinism, against which he emphasizes the demands of mind and morality. The humanity of the *honnête homme* certainly embraces more than the rationalistic interpretation of the *homme machine*. This is even more strongly expressed by the German exponents of the idea of humanity. Goethe draws in Faust the image of tragic man, who, with the power of knowledge, remains the same ignorant fool whose good intentions leave him stranded because of his human shortcomings, but who, in spite of this, can find release because of his indefatigable striving. More than in the hellenic æstheticism of Winckelmann and his group, one finds here the rediscovery of the

tragic sense of Greece. Kant also should be mentioned who, on the one side, gives reason and morality a truly autonomous foundation, i.e., in obedience to the law that functions in man himself and, on the other, fully recognizes the inner discord of human liberty that manifests itself in both the good and the evil will.

The continuation of this broken humanism one finds not so much in the classical German philosophy as in the concrete humanism of Marx. In the steps of Feuerbach, he starts from the assumption that the consciousness of God must be considered to mean the consciousness of an ideal humanity that cannot withdraw itself from the limitations and determinations of the species. With him, philosophical humanism becomes social humanism which joins battle over the de-humanizing of man by social relations based on his egoism. The victory over this de-humanization by a revolution of social relations effected from the depth of human misery is the humanistic motive of his doctrine. Since then the norm of justice—which has always been an element of humanistic thought—has remained a fundamental demand of Humanism, although not in unbreakable connection with traditional Marxism which, indeed, was not its source.

Another turn in the trend of humanistic thought is to be found in Comte. According to him man has "now" come to recognition of a number of natural laws which are the expression of the relations between things in their development. In "this" positivistic period science will furnish the data enabling man to unfold his life. This positivism meant more than scientific method; it aimed at being a religion of humanity with its own cult. Apart from this an evolutionary humanism developed in the footsteps of Spencer. It brings Darwinian doctrine of the development of species in close connection with the spiritual development of mankind; in the sense that the unique spiritual faculties of man contain his further possibilities; and that in the direction of a progressive integration of human conditions of existence.

In France, apart from a pronounced positivism, a living cult of the *studia humanoria* can still be found as the basis of a humanist view of life. In Germany the materialistic current that goes back to Hæckel and Büchner is not without importance; but in that country the idealistic tradition also is still alive, of which Thomas Mann was an exponent. Apart from this the body of humanist ideas was greatly influenced by both explicit nihilism from Nietzsche to Sartre and twentieth-century's existentialism. In his philosophical belief K. Jaspers represents a characteristic synthesis between Kantian philosophy and existentialist phenomenology.

Thus modern Humanism shows, apart from biblical variants and Chinese and Indian thought a great variety of forms. Often, however, in modern Humanism, a turn can be observed away from an individualistic, optimistic speculative doctrine to a socially directed, tragically coloured, and phenomenologically based conviction of life.

II. ASPECTS OF MODERN HUMANISM

The non-theological Humanism that particularly is the subject of this exposition manifests itself in the modern world in many varieties. The world of humanist thought is as it were dominated by a number of polarities that may be discerned as tensions between a more reflective interpretation of reality and a more participating experience of it. In this way the contrast can be understood between the philosophical aspects of Humanism and its phenomenological approach. Partly connected with this distinction is the contrast between the rational interpretation of life and the world and the religious experience of them. Again, closely connected with this contrast is the tension between a harmonious and a tragic view of life. It hardly serves any purpose to describe briefly these tensions in and between the various aspects of modern Humanism. Such an effort would only be fully elucidating in a wider cultural-sociological connection. It is enough to give a summary of those aspects as they present themselves at first sight, though the above tensions can be noticed between and within all varieties.

Positivism

The Humanism of positivistic shade which can be met mainly in the United States and Great Britain often has an instrumentalist character. Thought is considered nothing but an instrument for the development of man and mankind. It is an organ of active adjustment in the evolution of the species and the individual, a means to connect recalcitrant reality and creative impulse. A deep and intensive confidence is assumed in this line of thought without being explicitly motivated. It is understood as a fundamental belief in which ideas like liberty, equality, and solidarity are also included. The realization of this belief depends on the impartial assimilation of experience. The way in which this should happen is by means of scientific method. The latter should be taken to mean an attitude characterized by openness of mind, a perpetual search for factual data and the willingness to give up opinions should facts demand it. Also in the realization of personal life and of human relations this method of trial and error should be the basis of a practice worthy of man. Sciences dealing with man, like sociology and psychology, are in this connection of great help.

In this train of thought—it could easily be misunderstood—the idea of human destiny and universal connection is always present. Often this aspect is indicated by the word religion. John Dewey describes the religious attitude as fundamentally a thoroughgoing and deeply-rooted harmonizing of the "I" with the world. The religious experience has the power to bring about a deeper and more lasting adjustment

to life. Religion is the encouraging and inspiring impulse in human existence. It is striving after the complete fulfilment of life, which fulfilment also includes the respect of and the solidarity with each fellow-man as a particular phenomenon in the development of the universe. This kind of religion is decidedly earthly in character, directed towards the happiness of man, understood as the fulfilment of his human possibilities in an altruistic sense. This happiness needs no further motivation; it is its own justification. This view of life has been called scientific, secular, or naturalistic humanism. It is also often referred to as humanist "philosophy"; but this word should not then be taken in its technical meaning, as speculative, critical or phenomenological professional practice, but rather, in a broad sense, as a view of life and the world, as a conception of the universe and human existence.

Here would also be the right place to mention neo-positivism and its modern development. Under the influence of men like Bertrand Russell critical logic has exercised its influence on humanistic trains of thought, especially in Great Britain, but also in the United States ("general semantics"). But it can hardly be considered a separate aspect of Humanism.

Rationalism

A separate aspect of Humanism, however, is a current that might be called in a general sense, rationalistic. In England, but also elsewhere, it is of great importance. Contrary to positivism which looks upon every abstraction, inclusive of the abstract notion "reason", with distrust, this current has its origin in the eighteenth-century enlightenment and its belief in reason. But this belief also has naturally been influenced by a century and a half of critical thinking. It has become aware of its own starting point, reason. It acknowledges that in accepting this starting point lies an element of decision just as much as in accepting any other starting point, but it appeals to the universal character of human reason as a means of understanding truth. It does not pretend that reason could prove or deny metaphysical starting points like the existence of God, nor that reason could dominate, one-sidedly, human behaviour, the latter being determined by interior and exterior conditions; and finally it does not pretend that reason would be able to explain reality, wholly, in the sense of reconstruction from a theoretical "nothing".

But, with all this, rationalism yet recognizes reason with its logical, ethical, and æsthetical criteria as the test of truth, i.e. as the test opinions should stand in order to lay claim to general validity. That also means the necessity to revise opinions, conditions, attitudes, and decisions continually; not for the sake of scepticism in itself, but for the sake of a tenable and coherent image of the world and of existence. This is the never completed task of reason throwing its light on per-

sonal experience; there is no other means with which to tackle this task. The meaning of it is not the erection of an abstract structure but the creation of a basis for human responsibility. For this responsibility of man for his own fate and other people's is the assumption included in this humanistic rationalism. It determines the problems of this rationalism and the decisions taken on the basis of opinions thus acquired. And responsibility in its turn presupposes spiritual liberty.

It is clear that this rationalistic Humanism is a near relative of positivism. For reason works through the progress of positive science. The latter always discovers new facts and connections which force man to revise his conclusions. Science never supplies complete knowledge but it causes the growth of knowledge, which growth can lead to new opinions. It also does that in regard to the humanistic view of man himself. In this connection sciences like logic, physics, biology, and psychology should be mentioned which in their modern development have opened new aspects. Biology in particular has, especially in England, given an entirely characteristic contribution to humanist thought under the influence of Julian Huxley. The idea of evolution, which in general as part of modern thinking provides an essential element of rationalism, obtains, with him, another specific meaning in the development of the picture of man.

Evolutionism

Evolutionary Humanism is based on insight into the particular position of man in the whole of natural development. This "uniqueness" consists in the conception that the nature of man as dominating species is essentially determined by his faculty of "conceptual thought". And such a way of thinking could only originate in a multi-cellular, bilateral, symmetrical being with a head and blood-circulation, a being, moreover, which must have vertebræ and must be an erect mammal living on land. Besides, it presupposes an organism that lives in herds, that as a rule produces only one young at a time, and that, after having lived for a long time in trees, came down again to the ground.

The particular accent in this conception of man is this: human nature is not reduced to an inevitable result of a causal series, but, on the contrary, is surrounded with astonishment at the extraordinariness of the fulfilment of these conditions. There is only one passage to further development through the holes of the net of evolution. The process itself of human development is as extraordinary as its result. It is extraordinary not in the everyday sense of other-than-ordinary, but in the deeper sense that it is the only way along which advancing evolution can be realized.

In this conception, the birth of man appears as a dramatic world-embracing event, heavy with responsibility. From here runs a line to the phenomenon of language as a product and instrument of con-

ceptual thought and as a means of understanding. It also creates the possibility of an again extraordinary cumulation of human experience and of the rise of tradition on the basis of history taken in its pregnant sense. Bound up with this is the idea of vocation, which, with Huxley for instance, results in the conception of a humanist religion. This notion should be taken to mean more than the whole of ethical convictions, scientific opinions, or social conceptions. It means here: a connection of ideas and emotions by which man is related to his destiny, apart from and above everyday life and beyond actual reality and the existing laws and social structures, directed towards progressive ripening of life and a more complete realization of human possibilities.

Psychological Humanism

Especially in later German-Swiss psychology, authors have gone to much pains to lay open the principal foundations of this science, while also the newer American psychologists have repeatedly dealt with the image of man that is assumed in their science. Here also we can feel a tendency to stop reducing the essentially human to a normless balance of passions and instincts. Rather, the acknowledgement of what is essentially human is seen as a condition of acquiring a satisfactory psychical state of balance. Ethical and religious needs are recognized as elements of the healthy human psyche. It is the task of psychiatry to loosen neurotic brakes so that normal vital power can bring about a sound deployment of life.

Thus, integration of human personality in its totality becomes the fundamental motive of this psychological humanism. In this connection it is often said that every abstract formulation of demands to be put to human life is inadequate to express the absolutely concrete responsibilities of existence in which man has again and again to exert all his creative powers. This position also is based on an assumption; viz., that of the creativity of human personality, which is not normless, but directed. Thus a humanistic psychologist like Erich Fromm draws the conclusion that man knows what is permitted in the same degree as he really exists as man.

The real ethical problem of this time, therefore, in this train of thought, is the indifference of man as regards himself. Conscience is the appeal of our proper self that recalls us to ourselves in order to become what we potentially already are. It is the task of psychology to point the way to this selfdevelopment, the task of creative power to realize it.

Social Humanism

Another variant of modern humanism, also in a certain degree related to the above evolutionary conceptions, is the Radical Humanism of India. It is inspired by the views and ideas of M. N. Roy,

who came the way from Marxism to Humanism. This Humanism conceives man as a being that emerges from a world, ruled by laws of nature, in which it participates. Exactly by this participating in the laws of the Universe there exists relationship, affinity between human consciousness and developing reality. In reason this relationship finds expression. Reason has, as it were, emancipated itself in man from living nature. Therefore it is closely connected with sentiment and will. In the historic determination of the development of society this will expresses itself as the most powerful factor. It is directed towards liberty as the progressive lifting of all limitations for the realization of individual possibilities. This individual realization is the standard for the development of the whole.

This Humanism is decidedly directed towards society: it pleads reconstruction of society as a solidary community of spiritually emancipated and morally adult people. Without tying itself to any political party it wishes to inspire all politics with a true striving after emancipation and respect for human personality. It develops the idea of a society on a co-operative basis in the widest sense. Both in social and political life it pleads a federalistic structure as a guarantee for freedom, democracy, and justice. It is curious that similar trains of thought also came to development in certain currents within Netherlands Humanism. And in a certain sense on the same ground: viz., on the ground of the experience that every policy requires fundamental consciousness of its starting-points if it is to be of real service to the spiritual and moral emancipation of man.

For the sake of completeness, Soviet Russian Humanism ("gumanizm") ought to be mentioned here. The first man to propagate this term in Soviet Russia was Maxim Gorki. His is the dictum: "Man—that sounds proud." Addressing the Soviet authors, he wrote in 1933: "We are living in a happy country where there is an object of our love and esteem. With us love of man must result—and results—from a feeling of admiration for his creative energy, from respect for his boundless collective labour power by which socialist forms of life are created; out of love of the party which is the leader of the labouring people of the whole country and the teacher of the proletarians of all countries. . . . The Humanism of the proletariat requires an unquenchable hatred of petit-bourgeois-dom, of the power of capitalists and of their lackeys and parasites, of fascist henchmen and traitors of the labouring class—a hatred of all that causes suffering, all that lives on the sorrow of hundreds of millions of men." Soviet Humanism is undeniably socially directed; it expressly puts social justice above spiritual freedom. The origin of this is perhaps to be found in its foundation not on the essence of human nature but on man's social capacities and, in connection with this, on the party. Consequently it implies and requires hatred, not of institutions, but of men; so that it can hardly be recognized as authentic Humanism.

Philosophical Humanism

Apart from all these varieties, there are the various aspects of what one might call philosophical Humanism, which, especially in Western Europe, developed on the basis of classical philosophy from Kant on. Consciousness itself is here the starting-point of the conception of man and the world. And under the influence of the development of sciences and critical thinking this starting-point is often conceived as the notion of the distinction of the self and the not-self. This idea can in many ways become the basis of a humanistic view of life, in the sense that in the conception of the relation between the self and the not-self can be embodied, in various ways, a typically human responsibility. Cultural Humanism may be called the striving for conquest of the shortcomings of existence by an æsthetical framing of life in which at the same time an enriching deployment of human nature is enclosed. This aspect of e.g. German Humanism is clearly recognizable in a man like Thomas Mann in his effort to remain "master of contrasts".

In ethical Humanism the idea of morality gets full emphasis apart from the logical and æsthetical aspects of consciousness. Reason includes the faculty of logical, ethical, and æsthetical valuation. Thus the whole of human existence is subjected inevitably to the test of reason. In this way, human responsibility is essentially based on consciousness, independent of its biological, historical, psychological or sociological "explanation". Moral responsibility of man becomes the hallmark of his human nature. Under the influence of G. Heymans and his school this ethical Humanism has greatly influenced Humanism, especially in the Netherlands. Felix Adler initiated similar trains of thought which, under the name of "ethical culture", spread in the United States. This has taken the form of an ethical religion in which rational understanding, universal solidarity, and prophetic longing for justice flow together in a moral conviction of life, providing together a spiritual basis for a concretely organized life of individuals and groups.

A variety of philosophical Humanism is, finally, also the existentialist Humanism in France and Germany. Here K. Jaspers, in spite of his sometimes theological way of speaking, is perhaps the most characteristic exponent of humanist thought. Jaspers takes his bearings from the limit of experience which he calls the all-embracing reality "das Umgreifende". Now every further reflection causes the falling apart of this all-embracing reality into subject and object, in self-consciousness and world, idea and conception, existence and transcendence. So philosophical (humanistic) belief is the vivid notion that man exists in these tensions; it enables him to overcome routine and restrictions and to get rooted in the ground of his existence. Thus he can, all the more open-mindedly, devote himself to the investigation

of nature, which is the only way to knowledge. But he should not think that in this way he can as yet obtain admission to the knowledge of the all-embracing reality; he will always see aspects, seize fragments, and it is precisely his reasoning faculty which will keep him from regarding any partial truth as absolute truth. For reason is the absolute readiness to communication and understanding which is weakened by absolutizing any partial truth. But this essential incompleteness of knowledge also applies to man himself: he cannot be fully understood; somewhere he roots in the all-embracing reality, from which he endlessly unfolds himself. Therefore one cannot speak of perfect man, for he is growing perpetually. In his existence he tries to realize the sense of his being, in freedom and solidarity, in belief in his possibilities and in living contact with human tradition which in many respects gives admission to the sources of existence.

III. THE HUMANIST PICTURE OF MAN

The conceptions of Humanism, as sketched above, all have to a certain extent, although in different measure, contributed towards the total picture of modern Humanism. Without anticipating the results of this process one can, in the meantime, try to draw a provisional outline of humanist thought at the present stage. Such an outline however should give account of an essential turn in present humanist thinking. While it was up till now mainly concerned with the interpretation of man and the world, it should provide also a basis for human living, if it is fully to meet human needs. In the foregoing, naturally incomplete, outline of a humanistic development of ideas, the relation with cultural and social reality in past and present had to be left unconsidered. Such an outline is naturally abstract and hardly shows the influence of the progress of scientific thought and the changes in social relations. Therefore the development in Humanism itself from intellectual doctrine to conviction-for-many could not be brought out to full advantage either. For a good understanding of modern Humanism, however, insight into the socio-cultural secularization of the modern world since the industrial revolution, that is to say roughly since about 1750, is indispensable.

Decisive in this connection is not chiefly the enormous development of science (in biology and psychology, physics and logic), but rather the social changes and the resulting changes in cultural pattern. The small community groups and the corresponding traditions have disappeared; mechanization, urbanization and mass society have led to a disintegration of culture and an uprooting of spiritual life. Old ties, especially religious ties, are broken; for the first time in Western history secularity becomes a sociological problem. It is true that various kinds of new political, social, and cultural ties come into being, but they touch only a part of human existence and thus only lead to part-convictions. Any culture, however, is only conceivable on the basis of a conception of life that is in principle all-embracing and in which eros and aggression, passion and contemplation, experience and reflection participate. What is meant is a view of life — which may be unconscious and naïve — by which man with all his faculties is connected with the totality of his conditions of life. Without it, he is doomed to perish in his inner discord or to flee into a factual nihilism that always contains the threat of fatal short-circuits, leading to what has been called the revolt of the masses. Thus the socio-cultural situation is a challenge to Christianity and Humanism. Modern Humanism, for its part, tries to answer this challenge by developing an all-embracing humanistic conviction of life. In this conviction the picture of man is central.

Human Faculties

In spite of all varieties of humanistic thought, Humanism can be defined as an attempt to interpret life and the world by appealing to human faculties. Whatever biblical revelation and clerical tradition may mean for liberal-protestant and catholic humanists, and however great may be the recognition of the wisdom and beauty of their writings and traditions, yet it cannot be said of modern Humanism as such that it finds there its starting-point. The appeal to human faculties, moreover, does not necessarily claim the possibility of getting to the bottom of these faculties. Naturally they are open to scientific examination, but they can also, and in the last instance, be acknowledged as hallmarks, defining characteristics of human nature. Nor need it be supposed that the attempt to understand life and the world would in fact lead to perfect comprehension. The question must even be put whether a complete insight into reality is in principle possible. What is meant here is only a conception of life and the world which, though all-embracing, is involved in constant inward growth.

The basis of this conception of life and the world is a picture of man in which man is conceived as emerging in a world which, by its infinity of space and time, its logical inscrutability, and its tragical contradictions, presents itself to him as enigmatic. Thus man discovers himself as placed in mystery. This discovery, not only as rational insight but also as experienced reality, may give Humanism a principal feature of caution which expresses itself as fundamental diffidence in face of an awful and inscrutable reality of which man is no master. It then abstains, however, from every usurpation of the unknowable and recognizes mystery as a liminary notion of the faculty of reason. Mystery is the naught of reflection; the abyss before which the conception of man and the world makes a halt. In this sense this Humanism is agnostic, not knowing; it turns fundamentally from this abyss to the here-and-now, in which, however, it can continue to recognize that "naught" as a dimension of human existence.

In that existence the unique character of human nature reveals itself not only as intentional vitality in the midst of passive reality, not only as sensorial experience in the midst of unconscious vegetation, but also as self-conscious creation in the midst of instinctive deployment. The basis of this self-consciousness is the rational and moral structure of the human psyche. This recognition does not necessarily mean that man, by his nature, always acts morally. An optimistic vision of man is no necessary feature of Humanism. Rather it acknowledges that man is "by nature inclined to all evil", which means in humanistic terms inclined to renouncing his moral nature. Nor is the position taken that man would in fact always be rational or should be deemed capable of a fully rational penetration into reality. Nor is anything necessarily pretended here about the "whence" of the rational and

moral faculties; their validity is indeed independent of their metaphysical or scientific explanation. Humanism is, by its nature, no theory of explanation, but it holds that man is constituted capable of rational and moral evaluation, by which he confronts given reality with human demands.

Sense of Value

In a humanist anthropology man as a rule appears as bearer of a sense of value that precedes all conscious judgement and has coercive validity. It cannot be altered arbitrarily; that means that what should be taken as true cannot arbitrarily be deemed untrue, nor the good bad, nor the beautiful ugly. One should not think here of a system of acknowledged rules or fixed standards, but of a discerning faculty by which man again and again answers the changing conditions in which he finds himself. His inner sensitiveness, that is his faculty to heed the law of his existence, is the basis of his responsibility, which is directed towards the conquest of the arbitrary, the subjective, the selfish. This does not mean repudiation of the passionate, the instinctive, the individual. On the contrary, Humanism values the joyful vital deployment of the individual in a positive sense. It appreciates the natural human longing for happiness, but it considers as evil its arbitrary detachment from the objective connexion of things. The essence of human tragedy is thus seen in the parasitic growth of this arbitrariness on the obedience to the sense of value that constitutes the humanity of man. Nevertheless, he cannot withdraw from having to justify himself before his notion of truth, beauty, and goodness. For this very reason he is inclined to give to every form of denial or ousting of this notion a theoretical justification. Against that there is no other safeguard than unconditional reflection on the essence of human nature. This reflection has in Humanism the character of rational justification. Meanwhile, no feature of Humanism has given rise to so much misunderstanding. The meaning of the notion "reason" is thereby at stake. This meaning is in all varieties determined by the origin of the word: *logos*, *ratio*, *account*. He is rational who shows continual readiness, in thought and deed, to render account. This does not mean to say that in fact man should at any time render account of all his doings, but that the readiness to do so may be demanded of him. This account cannot, by the nature of the human spirit, mean constructing something from nothing, but resolving something into its elements or bringing it into connection with something else under the standard of the sense of value. By this readiness to "render account" subjectivity is conquered.

This conception does not encroach upon the irreplaceable significance of personal decisions. The contents of an objectively valid truth can be exactly that a certain person has, in certain circumstances, to take

certain decisions that answer only his personal situation. But the humanist will also be able to understand these personal decisions as belonging to a coherence that transcends the merely personal. This vision does not deny that the subjective consciousness comes about in dependence on ability and education, social circumstances and cultural situation, while every concrete judgement depends moreover on the knowledge and interpretation of the circumstances. But the acknowledgement of a fundamental sense of value then functions as an appeal to reflection and true validity. In the light of modern thought ever less stress is laid on a formal standard and ever more on a directed faculty for reflection on the relation of subject and object. The concrete contents of consciousness come about in the conscientious confrontation of this faculty with human experience under continual testing by the experience and the wisdom of ages.

This exactly is what should be meant by the humanist idea of autonomy, the idea that man carries in himself the "law" of his human nature and has to obey it. This implies a limitation in two directions: to the side of every authoritative regulation of conscience, for how else could truth be truth if not according to conscience determined by its own law? But also to the side of every arbitrariness: for how else could man be man if not by the fulfilment of his proper nature? This has nothing to do with "barren rationalism": whoever declares dogmatically that what turns out useful is right, or that only what can be experienced by he senses is real, denies autonomous humanity. Nor need this autonomy have anything to do with *hybris*, in so far as it is the contrary of arbitrariness and exactly directed towards that which man cannot arbitrarily control, the realization of humanity.

Solidarity

Autonomous humanity is also the basis of all real understanding among men. Without it they would remain strangers to each other, for every man's subjective experience or that of the group to which he belongs would hold at the same time the limit of his possibility of communication. But "rendering account" also means not releasing the other person, means unlimited readiness to communicate; thus, real solidarity. Where this readiness ends there begins intolerance, inquisition, and the concentration camp. Thus reflection on the essence of human nature leads at the same time to recognition of a typically human solidarity, for owing to it the other person is not only fellow-being but also fellow-man.

In the humanist picture of man, human solidarity is dominated by respect for the other both in his essential equality and his different individuality. This respect is a particular expression of the diffidence in view of reality in general of which man cannot arbitrarily dispose. As fellow-being in a perilous existence man requires unlimited de-

votion, but as fellow-man he further requires to be respected in his human individuality. As soon as the individual is in danger of being hidden behind an abstraction, the temptation to the most horrible brutality arises. Nationalism, race-prejudice, class rule, and religious persecution are in their absolutizing of an idea as many threats to concrete humanity.

Is man with all his attributes really such an admirable being? No, but he is all the same a being that requires a respectful approach; not because of his egotism, limitations, and errors, but in spite of them. This does not necessarily mean reliance on the goodness of man but it does mean respect, because even where he ought to be condemned, fought, punished, he deserves respect for his human value—a value that does not consist of what in fact he is and that does not depend on what he really ought to be, but that is determined by the creative possibilities which constitute his nature. In other words: man is not only a natural being but he is, on this basis, related to culture in which his true humanity is manifested.

The idea of solidarity is, moreover, not exhausted by the idea of respect. The proper nature of human existence involves that true development of one's own being can only be completed in community; and community means sympathy and compassion, solidarity and devotion. To be human means to be related to others. But also to other things. It is sometimes, wrongly, thought that Humanism and individualism are two aspects of the same thing. Respect for the person is instead a characteristic feature of Humanism, and, speaking historically, it often represents a piece of emancipation from collectivistic life; but emancipation of the person does not exclude that the person is principally conceived as part of a world to which he is fully related.

Modern Humanism recognizes that man participates in natural, social, and cosmic relations from which he cannot withdraw himself unpunished. Not only is he taken up in the circle of blood relationship but also in a wider sense he takes part in nature. As a biological being he is a link in the natural development with which he feels himself connected body and soul; and for him, as man of culture, nature means an environment in which he can feel he is taken up and which at the same time can fill him with awe. But precisely as a man of culture he has also part in social relations. For him society is not only expression of a natural herd-instinct, but also, on the basis of his sense of value, expression of a real human solidarity by which alone society can become community.

Of another order still is the recognition of being-taken-up in a cosmic relationship. Already, strictly rationally, it must be recognized that human existence cannot be thought of apart from the conditions and circumstances of the solar system, and the significance of cosmic rays for the whole of biological existence is more and more realized. Spiritually speaking, modern culture is moreover unthinkable without

the knowledge that is contained in the cosmic image of the world. Some currents of thoughts within Humanism, moreover, acknowledge in it not only an intellectual insight but also a piece of inner experience. Particularly they pay attention to the fact that man discovers himself as a speck of dust in space, as a moment in time, emerging in an eternal stream that pushes him on. This idea, when the meaning is unambiguous, can be called religious in a general sense. Such a religious notion also contains astonishment about the nature of reality, mixed with a sentiment of insignificance and awe, together with the inkling of a sense in existence as the particular fulfilment of the impulse that pushes history along. Not until he experiences his participation in all-embracing reality can man, in the thought of religious Humanism, reconcile himself to existence and fully realize his destiny.

Human Existence

Reconciliation need not necessarily mean failure to appreciate the insufficiency of human nature, that is to say, the shortcomings of typically human faculties in face of the refractoriness of the world. In Humanism there is room for the recognition of human nature in its paradoxically split character: life in the reach of death, belief in the grip of fear, fulfilment in the depth of sorrow, reasonableness in the whirlpool of the passions, solidarity in the chaos of destruction. Death, fear, sorrow, passion, and downfall are the borders within which human life manifests its nature, even though these borders are not taken equally seriously in all forms of Humanism. Confronted with the silence of death, man can experience life in a new absoluteness; seized by the oppression of fear, he can anew realize from what source man really lives; thrown in the abyss of sorrow, he can learn to understand happiness; confronted with the intoxication of the passions, he can enter the service of order; sucked into the whirlpool of destruction, he can feel himself called to unlimited compassion. Thus, life and death, belief and fear, happiness and sorrow, reason and passion, solidarity and destruction create in their unbreakable coherence the fullness of existence of which they together form the essential elements. To accept this, not only in theory, but in the experience of one's own perilous existence, can provide a new dimension of life.

This vision includes the possibility of a complete humanity, although imperfect. This means accepting the split character of life but nevertheless aiming at humanization of existence; humanizing, not as necessarily implied in the perspective of an optimistic myth of progress, but rather as a continual struggle for an ever again possible breakthrough of humanity. If there is a myth here, then it is in the sense of an image that is neither projected on the past nor in the future, but in the present reality, pointing the way from the reality of experience to a reality that is conceived inwardly. This inner reality provides an

image of human existence, an existence which, in its dependence, aims at the realization of freedom. Thus is the fundamental thought of all humanism expressed in this: man is the being that only by transcending itself realizes itself. Human existence is only to be conceived as human deployment, a deployment which aims at true humanity.

IV. HUMANISM AND LIFE

Humanism, in these considerations, is understood to mean a conviction of life by which man with the totality of his faculties is connected with the totality of his conditions of existence. These conditions of existence embrace partly his relations to the universe in the measure in which it lies within the circle of his experience; partly they concern human relations in which he lives. Precisely when Humanism presents itself with the pretension to be an all-embracing conviction of life it should offer a basis for the practice of existence. Not in the sense that it gives detailed answers to the incidental questions of life, but in this sense that it offers the general possibility of solving daily problems, no matter what their cultural or political interpretation. This further interpretation is dependent on the judgement of factual circumstances, but the principal basis provides the condition for a humanistic interpretation. It goes without saying that also in this respect the varieties of Humanism will give their own accents.

The most embracing community with which Humanism is thus confronted is society as a whole. In this area of evergrowing technical coherence the fundamental unity of men is in fact realized more and more. This fact implies piecemeal realization of the Humanist picture of man, in which man as such is appreciated whatever his nation, race, politics, or culture. Thus in fact does the approach of every fellow-man, wherever in the world, enter the visual sphere and thereby the basis is given for an all-embracing solidarity that corresponds to the humanistic picture of man. Not the personal relation between men, however, is the first problem now under discussion but the demands to be put forward by Humanism to society as a whole. In this regard the assumption seems legitimate that the relations between states, groups of states, and supranational organizations are, with regard to human society, not essentially different from those between individuals, groups of individuals, and organizations within the state. Consequently, what matters first is the humanistic view of the state.

The State

The state is to be conceived as an organization grown historically and reformed by men. Historically grown means influenced in the course of time by numerous unverifiable biological, psychological, and sociological factors; reformed by men means regulated in accordance with ideal or practical standards. Consequently, the state has a double character: it is neither just devised, nor grown of its own accord. It has two aspects, viz., that of apparatus of power and that of community-organ, that of coercion-organization and that of establishment of law, which two aspects are twined together in a particular way.

Determining their mutual relation, one should keep in mind that the state community is not the only community in which man lives, and the other, smaller communities to which he belongs have, to an equal extent, their specific rights and duties. Nor is the individual exclusively and completely determined by the communities in which he participates: he is both community-member and individual in indissoluble coherence. Every individual can only constitute the community by his own social nature and by his reason. On the other hand community is even unthinkable without the individual. Community and individual equally have an original reality. Thus authority in the community, also in the state-community, is bound to the recognition of rights and duties of individuals and groups and thus aims at general welfare.

By what standard, however, can the humanist test this general welfare? In this testing he will before all appeal to the sense of value that characterizes man. On this basis he is conscious of values like justice, freedom, and tolerance, and social order, worthiness, and morality. The furtherance of these and other values constitutes at the same time the justification and the standard for state-authority; thus it is fundamentally withdrawn from individual or group arbitrariness. It finds its limitations there where other organs or individuals can better serve the values at which it aims. In practice this will often mean that the state creates frames within which the realization of the values takes place, because this realization itself often does not harmonize with the coercive and impersonal character of the state. In the first place, room and respect must be demanded for the individual both where it concerns the practice of his deepest conviction of life and where it concerns spiritual communities in which this practice is realized. By analogy, this demand indeed holds good in the political and cultural sphere.

In this the humanistic view of the equivalence of wholes and parts and also of the mutual equivalence of the individuals finds expression. What is meant here is not a vague equality of all men in which the irreplaceable features of everybody's personality are blurred, but respect for the essence of human personality as bearer of creative capacity. This capacity, which for everyone has an extremely personal significance, is nevertheless also that which potentially all men have in common. Equivalence should therefore not be taken in the sphere of measurability, as expression of a non-existent equality in material or spiritual productivity, but as a symbol of the essential equality of men with regard to their fundamental human disposition. It can naturally be the basis of equal respect and equal possibilities only within the scope of the differences in ability, temperament, and character. Thus, however, it is at the same time essentially directed towards freedom.

Freedom in a pregnant sense means for the humanist that man can bring his characteristic sense of value into operation in his life. This

freedom is consequently no arbitrariness but obedience to an inner principle. It can be impeded by inner and outer forces. In so far as man is dominated by passions and instincts and by them becomes disloyal to human values, he does not feel free. Nor is a man free who is kept from the realization of humanity by outer impediments. It should therefore be demanded of society and state that in their structure they create the conditions for an unimpeded realization of humanity. That supposes a social structure that makes possible a significant insertion of the individual in the whole of the community. This is fulfilled by the democratic constitutional state, as the realization of legal security and legal equality, of free expression of opinion and co-partnership. Democracy is valued here not in the first place as a system of rules-of-the-game, within which political aims can be striven after by tactics and shrewdness, but especially as a form of expression of diffidence in arbitrary intervention in the lives of others. It is based on tolerance. Tolerance is respect for others in their honest conviction of life even though one cannot agree with it. It corresponds—immediately—to the humanistic picture of man and is therefore not at all colourless indifference but a positive principle. This tolerance will be defensible when threats or attacks arise in a community against freedom to live according to one's own convictions. Yet then Humanism demands respect for others, also for the intolerant, even if he is to be fought.

Justice

The idea of freedom developed here demands that the possibility of everyone's personal deployment is guaranteed as much as possible, although, to this end, also restrictions can be imposed on everyone. In the community this gives rise to a number of questions of law which in principle should be dominated by the idea of justice. This idea expresses the above demand that people are recognized as equivalent in the free realization of their humanity under the standard of a not arbitrary sense of value and that differences in treatment should rest on grounds that are to be demonstrated and to be answered for. This means, in the first place, that justice is connected with freedom, not as a secondary addition but as an essential element. In the second place, that justice is conceived as fundamental legal equality, although there may be good reasons for a certain inequality. In a corresponding way social justice consists of justice in regard to social production and distribution and everyone's position therein. It implies that people are entitled to such a part of the production and that they can occupy such a place in the whole that thereby they are recognized as equal in their possibilities, in so far, again, as differences do not rest on demonstrable and justifiable grounds.

This indicates at least to what consequences Humanism gives rise in regard to society, whatever the important variations that present

themselves in the further political elaboration of them. But this sketch also gives a further directive for humanist demands in the international field. Here also freedom cannot mean arbitrariness but only freedom within restrictions. Naturally, national liberty can only mean the possibility of national unfolding within an international legal order which guarantees for each nation the certainty of existence as the basis for material and spiritual realization. Here also freedom is possible only in so far as a nation subordinates itself under the standard of an idea of justice which also in international relations implies recognition of the fundamental equivalence of nations. It stands to reason that this recognition can be demanded from a nation more easily if the idea of justice is the standard in its national state-order, and in general it may be supposed that a real international legal order is possible only among constitutional states.

Thus also the realization of social justice on a world-scale is dependent on the measure in which social justice has been realized within the nations. But here also the rule applies that the nations themselves are entitled to such a part in the world-prosperity and such a place in the society of nations that thereby they are recognized as equal in their possibilities under the standard of justice. The humanist contribution thereto may be a scientific one, by mobilizing all possibilities of thought for a productive solution; a political one, by striving with all might after the realization of the necessary conditions; but above all a moral one, maturing minds for recognition of world-wide solidarity.

Family and Education

The above ideas of respect, freedom, tolerance, and justice have significance not only for social life but equally also in personal life, even though in that domain personal devotion, friendship, and love are moreover of great importance. In the first place, the family demands attention. It is not only a unit determined by blood relationship, but as a human form of existence it is also a spiritual community. As such it is dominated by marriage. Marriage may be characterized in a humanistic sense as an attempt to unfold the biological, social, moral, and spiritual possibilities of each partner in devotion to and respect for each other's individual existence. It implies both the full staking of the whole personality in marriage and the orientation of marriage on society.

In principle, marriage is for the humanist a lasting community of life. Directives in it are respect for fellow-man, possibilities of development of every member of the family, and the interests of society. The humanist does not deem marriage in all circumstances indissoluble. For, without denying loyalty in marriage as an important factor for its preservation, the absence of ties of love can in the long run lead to such serious damage to personality and human dignity that mar-

riage comes to mean the denial of the values it should promote. In view of the fundamental conception of marriage, one should, however, keep in mind that practically every divorce implies in a very real sense that both parties to the marriage have fallen short and failed.

The meaning of this falling short and failing is in a high degree determined by the value Humanism gives the family as community of life. It is of irreplaceable value as milieu in which the personality realizes itself in community with others. The affection of the members of the family for each other provides the fertile soil for the formation of a close community even though this affection can have dangerous sides. Affection of exclusively a passionate character secludes man from his environment and can moreover become the basis of a condemnable family-egoism. Therefore, Humanism demands that the family provide a milieu in which there is ready mutual respect among the members of the family for their own sake and at the same time furtherance of the growth from closed to open community. The demands of mutual respect and justice, of freedom and responsibility, can find their complete realization in the family provided the latter is based on the recognition of these values. Whoever has learned to appreciate these demands in the mutual family-ties will naturally fulfill them in a wider community. The family that will answer to these demands should, however, be rooted in a conviction of life that provides the basis of family-life and education.

This is the place to devote some words to humanist education, not only within the family but, supplementarily, also at school and the so-called third milieu. Humanist education should be based on the possibility of independence of the child and therewith in the first place directed to self-determination. Apart from this, education in a humanistic spirit is normative, that is to say, directed to a sense of value. Education should mean to help the child on its way to becoming a "valuing person", to realizing the person he can be. This idea implies that education is a referring activity, viz., referring to the essence of human nature. Herewith a stand is made against two points of view: against that of the unrestrained unfolding of the child, and against that of a formation in complete accord with the model of adults. The humanist can never see in the child only a material that he can form into a defined pattern of adulthood. On the other hand this education implies certainly a measure of guidance, of which the nature changes with age. Education is consequently determined particularly by the humanist conception of freedom, as a summons to sensitive obedience to an inner experience of values.

Motives and Ideas

Education does not end with adulthood. Humanism itself is the expression of the idea of continual human deployment by an ever

more complete experience of values. It is a summons to a continual discovery of humanity. The humanistic word is an appeal to this end. But it is an illusion to assume that by words alone the call of Humanism is sufficiently heard in this epoch. This would presuppose a readiness to listen, which in modern man is precisely what has been largely lost. Therefore an intensive concern with individual man is required, directed to the rediscovery of his own humanity. It is seen in this light that a particular significance should be given to humanistic spiritual care and to the humanist contribution to social work.

By spiritual care is to be understood the systematic official concern with man in the development of his humanity in order to activate the forces enabling him to apply a conviction of life independently. Official here means not necessarily professional, but it means that something else is to be thought of than interested devotion on the basis of accidental personal relations. On the other hand, concern should not be understood as meddlesomeness, but as expression of human solidarity under respect for everyone's fundamental independence. Thus spiritual care is not a patronizing approach to people in need, but it is an appeal to human nature and a summons to deployment of humanity in everyone.

Humanism bears witness to the possibility of a human life that is an existence worthy of man. That should be taken to mean a complete development of human possibilities of body, mind, and spirit under the standard of humanity. Humanism bears witness to these possibilities in spite of guilt and deficiency. Guilt arises from moral failure, when man does not will what he recognizes as true, good, and beautiful; when his actions do not correspond with a good disposition. But we should speak of human deficiency when there is failure in spite of good disposition, because insight was insufficient or forces were inadequate, or because circumstances finally overgrew good disposition. A measure of guilt and loneliness is possible which man, in more reckless days, cannot imagine; and human deficiency can lead man to the verge of desperation or, worse, to dull indifference.

Against these needs Humanism has to advance its motives and ideas, as an appeal to the restoring force of life. By motives are meant the conceptions which can set man into motion; and by ideas, attitudes that make him experience his existence as significant. They derive their meaning from the fact that in a crisis they make a man feel again his responsibility in a concrete way, and enable him to direct his attention towards his human situation. Two such motives are loyalty and courage; two such ideas, work and community. Their humanistic character they derive from the humanist conviction in which they find their place.

In this connection loyalty is understood as readiness to take fully seriously the situation in which man finds himself, partly by his own decisions, partly as a result of his circumstances of life. It means

readiness to start unconditionally from that situation, considering all realities as a challenge to one's own responsibility. It is no resignation in the sense of passive acceptance of that which is, but acknowledgement of one's own position as the starting-point for all further actions. It implies a state of being unconditionally thrown back on the here and now with which man is concerned with his whole personality. It is an attitude not of dutiful loyalty, but of complete identification with the reality of existence, no flight being permitted or possible. Of this the necessary completion is courage. It implies this duty to enter fully into the dependencies of existence in realizing the possibilities of life. It puts all stress on the inevitableness of decisions in which man in all his limitation is yet present with his whole personality, and in which all motives to be considered come into operation. Thus man participates in a typically human way in the realization of the values of life, which are not dependent on success or failure and which cannot be taken from him by anybody. Seeing his human task, he sees his task in realizing humanity.

As ideal moment, work has a fundamental importance in human existence, even in spite of the social circumstances which often threaten the joy of labour. Not only one's ordinary work in the community is meant here but also hobbies, study, and art. Work is a significant expression of creative energy, even without human imperfection being removed. This creation, meanwhile, is not at all arbitrary but connects man with the world in which only by this he finds himself at home. In his work he realizes his creative humanity, he gives reality a human accent, and he can feel being above the level of his individual existence. He who works does not despair. Apart from work, the community has fundamental ideal significance. In a time when community relations, even the family, are in a crisis, a renewed direction of attention towards solidarity with fellow-men and environment means a fundamental victory over loneliness. The possibility of being taken up again in some community does not only open new prospects on possibilities of life but also represents in experience the sense of being taken up in the coherence of reality. Nobody is so lonely that no one exists who is dependent on him; nobody is so uprooted that the world does not await him. In the connection with man and the world lies the rescue from human deficiency.

Real humanity cannot be understood from individual satisfaction with existence, because man can only fully be conceived as man in the world and amongst fellow-men. Thus the witness of Humanism is the proclamation of the possibility of an existence in which man, in every degree of development and deployment, realizes his nature by his connectedness with the world. This witness does not speak of perfection, but of humanity which in spite of continual shortcomings and inevitable faultiness aims at completeness. Thus the humanistic vision of life arises above moralism, which only keeps up to what

man already knew, viz., how he should live. That is far from unimportant, but it is not the last word. The last word speaks of the possibility of man to know himself, in all his failures and successes, his despair and belief, reconciled to existence. Not as flight from reality but as starting-point for a resolute turning towards his task, for the realization, in given circumstances, of possibilities which are implied in his own nature. It is in that sense that again and again it concerns the realization of humanity here and now, in the family, in daily life, in political party or cultural movement, as citizen of the state and as producer. For the all-embracing reality is for man only attainable in his own situation, via fellowman and environment. All that diverts from that means, in humanist eyes, flight from responsibility and denial of real humanity.



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