III

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

1. STATE AND SOCIETY

The basic thoughts of humanism are derived from the humanist way of life. They do not just serve for intellectual satisfaction, but also demand to be applied. They can provide practical life with insight and coherence. First of all, this applies to people as members of society. Society is based on a peculiar interplay of self-assertion and relatedness to the other. This is expressed in history by a coherence of contrasts, gradually regulated into a more or less fixed pattern. There have been and still are associations, mainly small and technically not very developed, within which it seems possible for a great measure of harmony to rule, if only because private property plays only a limited role. However, even here there are certain tensions, particularly with regard to other associations that might easily be perceived as foreign and hostile. These tensions certainly exist between and within larger associations, because they were created by the dominance of strong individuals over others, or of one group over another. This has led to continuous battles, rebellions, and wars and, particularly since the eighteenth century, also to revolutions. Though one might wish to reinstate some of these small, intricate, but balanced associations, it seems that with the present world population of billions of people, this is just an illusion. However, this is the desire at the roots of the thought about a return to a smaller scale, which these days one hears in different forms in our society. But it is not only the small scale that is important. In the Western world a process of rationality, individuality, and productivity has started that

encompasses practically the entire earth and which no longer seems to be entirely reversible. In that process, humanism as we know it has appeared again, both as a product and a critique of a society within which man is both discovered and ignored.

Modern humanism could not really have developed without the awakening in Athens, the city culture of the Renaissance, and the urban culture of the modern world. In that sense it is a typically middle-class idea, a characteristic it shares after all with almost all other modern ideas. As one can easily see, this also applies to the revolutionary philosophies, obviously to the American and French revolutions, but also to the social revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The powerless never produce revolutionary ideas. It is always those who are on the verge of having power. Critical citizens, intellectuals and semi-intellectuals, and these days also officers—not generals, but colonels. Gradually a peculiar shift occurs in this respect. The original humanist concept of freedom to achieve human dignity changes increasingly into liberation from misery. The greater the appreciation of the distress of the masses, the greater the stress on material equality as compared to (equal) entitlement to freedom, perhaps because it is becoming feasible to eliminate the former. Initially this shift of accent is not so obvious, because it is thought that human dignity is based on a simultaneous realization of freedom, equality, and fraternity for all. The one thing seems to follow the other. What does freedom mean if inequality prevents the masses from really using it? On the other hand, what good does material equality do if submission to a regime seems to be a condition for maintaining equality. And, finally, what happens to fraternity if liberty is only applied to a few privileged people or can be smothered in a uniform paternalism?

One might object that this is a dilemma that can only be stated like that from the point of view of the privileged. It is understandable that the most aware among them are not willing to accept this poignant inequality and are prepared to sacrifice their privileges and those of others for an equality that applies to all people. The masses do not ask for liberty, they say, but for prosperity, meaning liberation from need and its concomitant lack of freedom. But that is only partly true. It may for the moment apply to large parts of the Third World and to some other regions, but certainly not to those regions where a minimum of prosperity has been achieved, which became obvious in Southern Europe in the seventies. There, too, a more equal distribution of prosperity is in great demand, but the "masses" certainly do not mean that they are prepared to sacrifice their freedom of opinion and association or their right to strike and to free elections. Even if they might not initially resist this sacrifice of freedom tooth and nail, it would still be paternalistic to consider that the "masses" do not need it. The point is not to remove the rights from the privileged, but to provide actual new rights to the dispossessed; and if they are not asking for it so much the

worse. That is, then, with regard to liberty, *"die verdammte Bedürfnislosigkeit"* that Ferdinand Lassalle mentioned. That expresses a greater amount of humanist motivation than simply accepting the assumption that the masses are after all just out for the main chance. Any human being is entitled to human dignity and, though that is not possible without a certain amount of prosperity, it cannot be achieved without a reasonable amount of liberty. This also applies to the population of the Third World, whose overriding poverty is our responsibility as well.

Is it possible to achieve liberty and equality together? One should not forget that liberty creates inequality, because real liberty can be used in different ways. And inequality cannot even be approached without restricting liberty, namely, the liberty to oppose the attempt to achieve equality out of self-interest or for other reasons. But the greater the opposition, the greater the lack of liberty—not only for those who feel disadvantaged, but also for those who consider that liberty is too restricted or that the enforcement measures are too strong and so on. This is not a theoretical construction but is exactly what one increasingly observes in practice. Once equality has been established and liberty suppressed, there is no place from which a new liberty can come. Threats of inequality always remain. Moreover, the very structure of equality provokes new inequality between the guardians of that equality and those who enjoy its blessings. That again requires oppression of the liberty to oppose it. The question arises whether all that was thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries about liberty and equality as mutually reinforcing ideas was just an illusion. Perhaps not, but each partial idea, when it is fully thought through, carries the risk of becoming an abstraction that does not correspond to the interactions in reality. People are neither free, nor equal, but humanists ascribe a (limited) freedom of choice and a (fundamental) equality to them, which should not be confused with any imposed uniformity. That results in their striving for optimum limitation of social obstacles in the way of freedom of decision and to optimum realization of the social conditions that provide equal opportunities.

These attempts result neither in unlimited freedom nor in absolute equality, but they do result in less constraint and less injustice. The desire for (abstract) perfection easily degenerates into maintaining a (concrete) tyranny; the desire for true human dignity opens a perspective on a precarious balance between freedom and equality. The question is: What could maintain this precarious balance? That is done by "brotherhood" or expressing it in a more sober and social terminology: solidarity of men. It is based on human relatedness but obtains its reality from the common dangers that threaten anyone who denies his own belonging. Existentially people are always dependent on one another, but this relatedness develops into mutual support only if they perceive their situation as a common destiny. That cannot be done by smoothing over of often very strong contrasts. The latter must be recognized and abolished, and for this purpose a

considerable power struggle may often be indispensable. But even then human dignity must be the guideline, because it must lead to a future in which people can together confront a common challenge. Class solidarity, which is actually rarely achieved and which in our increasingly intricate social relationships becomes ever weaker as an idea, was and perhaps still is a factor in the social struggle. But it is a matter of life or death to see to it that it does not hamper the prospect of mutual support on which a future worthy of mankind must be built.

The vision of a real human future often leads to a peculiar paradox: on the one hand, it seems as if this utopia is indispensable as an inspiration and a guideline for action, though it leads at the same time into a temptation to excuse all present inhumanity for the sake of this human future. Lenin is quoted as having said that the people of today are nothing but the fertilizer on the fields of tomorrow. Very poetic and extremely barbaric. Furthermore, such a dream of the future can easily cause a kind of farsightedness that prevents changes in the present that might not be very striking, but could be essential, from being appreciated. This can result in unproductive activity and even apathy, with the explanation that all one does after all is tinker with external symptoms. In a humanist vision of society, also in Marxist humanism, the illusion of a sudden jump from the realm of the necessary into the realm of freedom does not occur. Revolutions occur and are often unavoidable, but there is no reason to assume that they achieve more than what had already been patiently prepared in the minds of people and the principles of society. Revolutions are political events: they can express changes in the power structures and create conditions for the development of social processes, but they can neither produce nor reverse these. This leads us to the relationship between state and society and their effect on each other. Could one say that there is a humanist opinion with regard to the state?

The state was the result of contrasts in the larger social associations and was originally based on the power of dominant groupings. It serves to safeguard this power on which it is based, both against external and internal threats. The state was not invented, it occurred. Yet it could not have occurred without the intervention of human ingenuity; its original pattern is a product of human talent. That process never stopped: the state is continuously reshaped by people. This is because of the continuous change of social structures and the concomitant shifts in power structures. But its roots lie deeper; their ground is the human desire for free development and legal security desired by those who do not yet share the power of the state. First the nobility, then the bourgeoisie, and finally the workers. An increasing number of people received political rights, eventually also the right to vote, and later even social rights, and these are finally declared applicable to all citizens. During this process there is an interesting change in the character of the state. The power state, which mainly serves sovereign

interests, becomes a national state, initially mainly for the purpose of safeguarding order, subsequently a legal state with legal justice and equality before the law, and, finally, a social state or welfare state in which many social rights are guaranteed as well. No one will maintain that power structures no longer play a role, but it is interesting to observe that the exercise of power by the state, and within the state by interest groups, becomes more and more impersonal and intangible.

Louis XIV still had some grounds for saying: *L'état c'est moi;* the bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century still had a clear hold on the power of the state; but as a result of universal suffrage everyone now has a formal voice in the matter; there is no one left who can consider the state to be particularly his own. The paradox of the democratic constitutional state is that it is more intangible than the previous types of state, which were more closely linked to the interests of particular groups. Even now interest groups like employers and employees, the business world, and farmers attempt to get and maintain a hold on the power of the state, but because of the very clash of their interests they hold each other more or less in check and the state itself obtains an increasingly impersonal character. Furthermore, the welfare state, with the aid of an ever growing machinery, must interfere to an ever increasing extent in people's personal lives. This is the reason it is more and more perceived as a foreign interfering organism; though it was created by people, it does not really permit the citizen to recognize himself in it. This is the cause of a peculiar kind of alienation, which is different from the alienation that results from impersonal production methods based on the separation of capital and labor and the development of modern technology. Another interesting thing is that both types of alienation occur within the communist dictatorships, too, perhaps because there, too, the idea of a state of and for everyone is a fiction. The separation between capital and labor has not really been abolished in those states either, partly because there, too, technology follows its own development.

Alienation from the modern state acquires a particular dimension because of the power of the state. The state is an enforced community—one can hardly opt out of it—and is based on power. That power mainly consists of three elements: violence, organization, and authority. One should make a clear differentiation between these elements. The state has armed forces available to maintain itself both externally and internally. That provides the state with an ominous character that it would be pointless to ignore. Yet force is not much used in peacetime, and the more democratic the state, the less so, though it is always present in the background. In practice the organizational element of power is much more important, to the extent that that is the thing in which the citizen feels caught. But at the same time it is a means to protect the rights of people and to maintain a (precarious) balance. Force as represented by army and police is also based on this organizational element and not the other way around. Thus organization in

its turn rests on authority. Authority itself is not based on a formal relationship between "higher" and "lower," but on a recognition of the state as a legal instrument, serving a situation that is not without moral significance. If that is not, or not sufficiently, recognized anymore, one refuses to listen to authority. The organization becomes disorganized and the state force can no longer operate adequately either. Then a revolutionary situation may occur. Justification of the power of the state is based on the moral authority of the state.

Generally humanists do not reject the use of power, though the only justification for power is its use to limit another power as a means to dominate others. To start with, this applies to the power of the state itself, which is less threatening the more the various state bodies, e.g., government, parliament, judiciary, civil service, and lower bodies, efficiently check each other and keep each other in balance. But there are also different forms of power within the state, based on organization and authority: one only needs to think of political parties, trade unions, employers' associations, sectors of industry, and other interest groups. The power of the state must serve to pursue a balance of power based on a model that can pass the test of a humanist vision of man and society. This means in particular that the powerless and disadvantaged may not be oppressed and must be able to develop fully as people. The humanist approach of the state is critical and dynamic, because ever changing circumstances and insights always demand new things from a model of a state that can really satisfy human needs. But that also means that most humanists do not reject the state as a means of organizing just social relationships and achieving the conditions for human development. Yet this is the very reason that they will wish to put exact limitations on state intervention. The state creates conditions but does not provide its citizens with happiness. It cannot and neither should it try. The greatest disasters in this world are created by states that try to coerce their citizens into being happy.

All this does not provide humanists with concrete solutions for the problems with which they have to deal in state and society. And that is not something one should expect from any life stance anyway. Any concrete decision is the result of an interplay of social insights and opinions with regard to what being human consists of. Any philosophy of life is not a recipe, but a guideline. It is the motivation behind the insights and it stimulates incessant critical reflection on these insights so they cannot start living their own life contrary to the original idea. It particularly leads to acting with reticence when one has to deal with people. Because even if we are convinced that people are responsible for people and society, we cannot claim that we fully understand the human condition in the entire world. Human liberty, as limited as it may be, contains unknown possibilities. People's existence is not ready-made and they must carefully try to find their way. There is no theory that can provide them with it. Perhaps that is what

Aeschylus meant to say at the end of the *Oresteia.* When all suffering has been suffered and all gods have been placated, Orestes returns to his hometown of Athens. Ostracism is created to be able to find less violent solutions for feuds. Then the goddess herself descends into the town and speaks to the Athenians with, among others, these memorable words:

> And from your polity do not wholly banish fear.
> For what man living, freed from fear, will still be just?

2. DEMOCRACY

Humanism is democratic. Most humanists are in favor of a parliamentary democracy; a bad system, according to Churchill, but the best we have. The democratic constitutional state with an independent judiciary protects everyone's freedom and guarantees equality before the law. But that only goes as far as it goes. What do freedom and equality mean for the disadvantaged who steals and for the advantaged who manipulates? The results easily lead to lack of freedom for the one and privilege for the other. That is not an argument against equality before the law and the constitutional state, but it is an argument for greater social equality. Theoretically the matter is very simple. Social justice and freedom of decision follow from each other. Freedom without a certain amount of social equality means that most people cannot sufficiently use this freedom. Equality without a certain amount of freedom means that it is hardly possible to take advantage of this greater equality. But in practice it isn't as simple as all that. In order to achieve greater equality it is necessary to limit freedom. Though one might say that this is only a matter of economic privileges, experience shows that the abolition of privileges easily leads to the restriction of freedom, otherwise the privileged would not allow anyone to take their privileges away. The obverse is that, if one were to leave people free, this would very soon result in new inequalities. What can one do about this? Is democracy in this rapidly changing society a possibility at all?

History since the First World War makes it perfectly clear that a revolution with democracy easily results in a dictatorship without freedom and without equality. Weimar Germany and Chili under Allende are perhaps the most upsetting illustrations of this fact. Conspiracy, murder, and terror lead to reinstatement of an obsolete order and destroy both freedom and equality. But a revolution without democracy, like the one in Russia after the coup of the Bolsheviks, has after sixty years still not shown any return to freedom. Dictatorships do not abolish themselves. Though there is equality among the masses in the Soviet Union, this is not the case as compared to the privileged cadres, to say nothing of the unequal distribution of power. Many people now think that developments in China are promising.

However, that country not only has a totally different culture, but, from what one hears, what is going on there sounds very much like what happened after 1952 in the Soviet Union. We must wait to see what happens. Unfortunately the large democracies, starting with the United States, do not exactly project an inspiring image for democrats. Private interests can obviously still stop socially necessary measures. Watergate has become the symbol of power usurpation and corruption. What is found in the files of the CIA surpasses the most pessimistic expectations. The fact that all this has been revealed is obviously a plus for democracy, as is the fact that in the countries of northwest Europe social justice is increasingly promoted while maintaining constitutional freedoms. But, if one looks at the world as a whole with all its violence, terror, and unchecked power politics, democracy seems a very frail shoot that could die off at any moment.

Yet humanists stand for democracy, in spite of everything. What it comes down to is that one perceives the combination of freedom, equality, and relatedness as the basis of being human to such an extent that putting this into practice becomes a precondition for a really human existence. That means that an existence without freedom, equality, and relatedness is not worthy of human beings. There is no choice. Democratic humanism wishes to create the conditions for a worthwhile existence, in the sense that for as many people as possible as much freedom of decision as possible will be guaranteed without obliging them to carry too great a responsibility. No one knows if it can still be done but, if it is not wholeheartedly pursued, one can be sure it will not happen. For this purpose a certain control of social production is necessary, but also a directedness toward a democratic constitutional state.

Directedness implies that all conditions are not present everywhere for creating an all-encompassing democracy. Tanzania is often mentioned as a country on the road toward democracy. Perhaps the same applies to Yugoslavia as well. But what is decisive is the directedness toward total democracy; there is no road back that leads to liberty, equality, and relatedness. The road that leads to state capitalism has never shown itself to be the first step toward a humane way of living together. It creates a basically joyless world of servility and uniformity in which there is no place for the human adventure.

Is democracy therefore a panacea for all ills? Certainly not. It is a precarious way of living together, always threatened by undemocratic powers, always frustrated by half-heartedness, and always at risk because of indifference. Yet democracy can become strong. It does not have to accept being undermined. It can legalize the distribution of wealth and power. It can impose conscription or labor service, wherever necessary. However, even in a revolutionary period the really democratic forces should not be excluded, so that as many people as possible can be involved in as many decisions as possible. Once one has understood why one is a democrat, there is

no alternative, not only because of a few culturally privileged people, as is so often objected, but particularly because of the masses. At the beginning they are perhaps only interested in a reasonable share in prosperity, but why shouldn't they subsequently also wish to participate in the decisions concerning their own lives? And if that weren't the case, why should we just accept it? Freedom does not occur "afterwards" if it has not been incorporated from the start. A pluriform society, this cultural treasure of the privileged, will always be denied to the masses once it has been sacrificed to state capitalism. Particularly if one does not accept that there is a real difference between the upholders of civilization and the masses, one cannot be content with equality without freedom or vice versa, because all people need a worthwhile existence. But what does one do if the majority does not want it? Or does not have sufficient strength of purpose? Then democracy becomes powerless. But then dictatorship cannot bring a solution either, because the power to achieve genuine change lies in the mentality of the population. Without that all change is imaginary. The ripeness of the minds is a condition for democratic power.

Democracy also requires that contrasts are not carried to extremes, because it is based on an attempt to achieve consensus. In this context, the concepts *politicizing* and *polarization* are often mentioned. They are often used in relation to each other, but the one does not follow from the other. Politicizing is an indispensable element in a living democracy. It means that social problems are clearly presented as social problems and that a political decision is required for their solution, which can lead to different choices. The clarity in politics, and therefore also the operation of a democracy, is served by a clear awareness of the choices that must be made. That is the basis for a constitutional balance of power in a democracy. It is logical that government takes place in accordance with that balance of power, that is, based on a conscious choice. Obviously parties will also exploit their power structure to carry out their program; that is their task. If one wants to call that polarization, one cannot really object to it. But democracy does require that policy be made acceptable to as large a part of the population as possible. If that is omitted, polarization deteriorates into a kind of authoritarian system. In the long run this is impractical, because it increases the risk of uncertain policy changes at each election; but it is also incorrect, because a democracy is not only characterized by the power of the majority but also by the rights of minorities. The rights of the minority do not only consist in each individual's personal conscience being respected, but also in a recognition, as much as possible, of everyone's social insight.

Democracy is a type of government that is characterized by convincing: by deeds, but also by words. Therefore, compromise is an indispensable element in the development of a democratic society. It can take the shape of undignified haggling, where serious desires are mixed with pedestrian interests, but it can also be an expression of genuine tolerance. What is the

latter really based on? Not on indifference, which assumes that one opinion is as good as another. Nor on the fact that one might just as well grin and bear it. It is based on an insight in the relativity of all opinions in a society that no one can fully understand, but more particularly it is the expression of the conviction that truth can only be understood by people themselves and cannot be enforced. That tolerance does not exclude a battle between ideas and the concomitant power struggle, but includes it. It does, however, determine the character of that battle, which in reality is always about convictions. It means respecting the other in this struggle and controls the means with which one tries to achieve one's purpose. The limits of tolerance are obviously found at the point where it encounters intolerance. In reality one cannot talk about the limits of tolerance. That would be applicable only if tolerance were a passive principle, according to which one should accept absolutely everything. Tolerance requires, to the contrary, forceful action against intolerance. Tolerance is not meekness, but an active expression of a desire for democracy.

One might wonder whether this description of the desire for democracy is not based too much on what is generally called the harmony model. But that depends on how one wishes to describe it. Galtung used the term harmony model for an attitude that smoothes over real contrasts by formulae covering the conflicts. Obviously they are not solved by this and they continue to smoulder underground. Such a practice undermines the operation of a democracy, and it will be clear that this is not what was meant by the considerations above. Should we therefore select a conflict model? Indeed, if what we mean is what Galtung was thinking of when using this term, namely, a conflict control model. That means that one reveals real contrasts and fully recognizes them, including the interests and the power that are indispensably connected with these. Then one will have to find a framework within which these conflicts can be solved. How? By convincing, by compromises, and by tolerance based on the real power situation. It is obvious that Galtung cannot have meant anything else if one thinks of the fact that, when he developed his ideas, he included conflicts between world powers. But if one wishes to make our intricate society function, one cannot do anything else. It demands conflict control, because a real struggle could have catastrophic consequences for the majority of the population.

From all this it is obvious that the operation of democracy is dependent on certain conditions that are not present everywhere, but even when they are not one should try to go in that direction. Some humanists even think that one should go further. There are the humanists who favor an anarchistic society. Many people on hearing the term *anarchism* think of chaos and violence. But, though in the course of history there have been violent anarchists, most anarchists, particularly the humanist ones, tend toward nonaggression. For them, too, equality, freedom, and relatedness are a starting point, and they take this starting point absolutely seriously, relying

on the self-regulating forces in man and society. In that respect they show a certain affinity with a kind of ideal liberalism, with the difference, however, that among liberals competition predominates and among anarchists cooperation is more prevalent. Anarchists believe in moral resistance against all power structures by means of democracy, strike, civil disobedience, and passive resistance. What in certain circumstances they have achieved by this is quite remarkable. Their view of society is based on the ideas of mutual aid, shared property, and productive cooperation. As a matter of fact, however adapted to present society, the idea of cooperatives derives from their sphere of thought.

Anarchists visualize a society consisting of small autonomous self-governing units. That is where we find the origin of self-government of companies by workers and also of municipal councils as genuinely independent organs representing the entire citizenry. If necessary at all, the state could be no more than a federation of these free municipalitics. The society would derive its coherence from the free joining of the cooperative organs in enterprises and other social units. In this view of society not much attention is paid to the possibility that there might be deep-rooted egoistic and aggressive traits in people. For the time being the entire stress is put on the dehumanizing effect of property and power. One must furthermore assume that some anarchistic humanists consider anarchism as a yardstick for fundamental critical evaluation of all social thought rather than as a form of society that could actually be put into practice. Another difficulty is that we cannot imagine a more highly developed technological society, even if we restrict growth and promote a technology that is kind to the environment, without integrated policies and coordination of production. For that purpose there must be central directives, even supranationally. This responsibility must be incorporated in an anarchistic model. But in that case it increasingly approaches the democratic model with which other humanists work. They too are looking for forms which would make the technological organizational straitjacket of the modern state more flexible and more human.

Let's start with the fact that direct democracy in groups of over ten or twenty people cannot really be handled. The result is either chaos, or, more probably, unrestrainable leadership, which is often authoritarian and certainly not democratic. Democracy in larger groups is representative democracy. It is based on the assumption that people are capable of nominating representatives who are able to take care of their interests and to express their wishes. This capability is a factor that is often misunderstood, but it is important for the selective character of a representative democracy. There is insufficient reason to assume that, though not everyone can become a capable violinist, anyone can become a capable representative of the people. This is even more so for those who are supposed to carry out the actual governing functions. Governing is a difficult

and responsible task and requires people who are particularly suitable for it by talent, ambition, and experience. This is an essential requirement for democracy. Part of this suitability of a governor is also the recognition that he is a servant of those who have delegated him and the willingness to give continuous justification to the grass roots. On the other hand, these representatives and governors require the critical confidence of the grass roots. Without confidence the representative loses his self-confidence and his creative powers, which he needs to carry out his function. Without criticism he loses his appreciation of the functionality in the democratic process. Democracy is not organized mistrust—which is something the fascists say—but the organization of critical confidence.

Representative democracy cannot tolerate voters' (or the political parties') co-governing from day to day. For this they lack sufficient factual data. It is a fiction to assume that factual decisions can be taken on the basis of general principles in isolation. If this is done, it can easily result in such a tension between principles and practice that decisions are found to be impossible to implement; and lack of decisiveness is the rock from which democracy must always try to steer clear. Like anyone else who carries out an instruction, one must give a representative an opportunity to carry out his task according to his mandate, yet according to his own best insight. But he must remain ready for continuous justification and be willing to listen to critical guidance. If he fails, he should not be re-elected, or in particularly serious cases he should be recalled. But one should not forget in this respect that that is a condemnation of oneself, because one obviously has elected the wrong person. On average, every group will probably have the representatives it deserves. The relationship between representatives and grass roots is an interaction of interests and wishes of the group and the area of forces and possibilities within which politics always take place. This applies both to the direct political forces and possibilities and to the social forces and pressure groups of which politics is also the expression.

Therefore it is not sufficient for democracy to remain within a pattern that is obviously insufficiently capable of abolishing or at least reducing the feeling of alienation from the state. An increasing number of other means are offered for this purpose, the first one of which is of course participation. But the latter cannot be left to the occasional action of action groups, however useful they might be. Participation as an element of democracy must obtain a legitimate place in the democratic process by means of clear and brief procedures, and this is now slowly starting. Yet participation remains a purely advisory function. One cannot say that there has not been any participation if the recommendations are not implemented. But it is important for governments to appreciate that, if participation never shows any results, it will be even more alienating than no participation at all. Apart from this, however, more types of co-partnership in small governing units for neighborhoods and companies, or sections thereof, must be

found. This can be efficient if the area of co-partnership and its scope are clearly defined in order to avoid frustration here, too. And finally a space must be created for much more self-government in suitable units, again provided the foundations and the scope are clearly laid down. Perhaps this can be the start of a system in which the wishes of the people penetrate the conventional forms of democracy, though it does not replace them! A supreme body, composed of decentralized organs, does not provide a guarantee for a genuinely reliable representation of public opinion. In modern society the elected parliament remains the right place for public decisions in the struggle between political interests and desires.

All the same a number of conditions will have to be met for such democracies to achieve substance. The first one is finding the right scale. Neither a large scale nor a small scale is right for producing general solutions. There are matters that can be regulated in the correct manner only on a large scale and others that require small-scale solutions. This applies to government, industry, and technology. Each scale has a concomitant suitable form of participation, co-partnership, and self-government. A second condition is outlining long-term policies that obviously must be regularly updated. The clearer the policies, the easier a decentralization of power and self-government at lower levels. This not only would provide a citizen with a sense of considerable involvement but would also improve the control of social processes. Finally, the third and most important condition is a genuine desire for democracy, because there is no system and no game rules one could invent that will guarantee democracy if there is no democratic will to make society function democratically. This will cannot be imposed. It is a result of an interaction of circumstances that inspires the minds of people. That is not a matter of moralizing or preaching, but of self-confidence and maturing. That is something about which humanists in their social and personal life can do something, or it is at least the task with which they are confronted.

3. SOCIAL CRITIQUE

Humanism is not a political theory. It does not claim that it can provide concrete solutions for our present political problems. On the other hand, it does attempt to clarify the insights with regard to man and his world on which all political decisions should be based. Decisions of this type are based on a reciprocity with the evaluation of the actual circumstances, which are interpreted according to those insights. This is the reason that one cannot expect that a shared philosophy of life would lead to total agreement as far as political opinions are concerned. This is the reason that one finds a broad spectrum of political points of view among humanists. Yet there are political opinions that are incompatible with a humanist conviction.

Experience shows that humanist political beliefs vary from social liberalism to democratic socialism. In this context, however, it must be said that because of their convictions humanists have a critical attitude with regard to all existing forms of society because the requirements based on their image of man and his world are obviously imperfectly and often even hardly realized in the existing structures. This is the reason most humanists do not shrink from radical criticism of society. Anyway, they do not believe that one can have a conviction that is valuable and enjoyable in one's personal life without needing to draw its social consequences. Putting humanism into practice is impossible without changes in society, and that means changes in the power structure.

Yet one generally means something different when mentioning a radical critique of society. The trend that carries this name and which contains the rebellious movements of (young) intellectuals and artists means not only something more but also something basically different, as we shall see. It finds its theoretical basis, at least initially, in the thoughts of a number of philosophically oriented sociologists working with the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, the "Frankfurter Schule." Science and philosophy, according to its members, are never disinterested. They always serve an interest, if only the interest of existence; but in view of the power structures at any given moment that always means the interest of the dominant power group. However, the real interest of people—and this is an obvious humanist choice—lies in their freedom, equality, and solidarity. This is assumed to go without saying, so that the question is how this can be realized. That can only be done by the whole of society and by thinking of society as a whole. Doing this, one "discovers" that the present stage of historical development is characterized by an impersonal exchange of goods, in which the exchange value is the essential value subjugating all other values, even that of man. This basic idea, taken from Marx, directs attention exclusively to the relationships in the production process and assumes that changing the latter is the only way to get rid of the central role of the exchange value to give preference to liberty, equality, and solidarity.

The duty of critical thought is to unmask the false interests and reveal the real interests. The exchange of goods, permitted by technological development, is an expression of the interest linked with the control of the means of production. Critical philosophy provides a point of view that explains this. That leads to the conclusion that the labor factor is shortchanged by it, and that leads to irreconcilable class differences. This is basically because, in practice, the workers can, through organizing, obtain a considerable share in consumption, at least in the technically highly developed countries. This has become possible because of the unprecedented increase of production forces and the exploitation of the Third World. But it does not change anything in the inequality of power and, thus, in the denial of human dignity. As a matter of fact, these partial

improvements perpetuate the injustice because real reinstatement of human dignity by abolishing the inequality of power now goes against the subjective interests of the working class. They are insufficiently conscious of their position, and for the time being one cannot do much more than try to provide a theoretical clarification with regard to the basic evil of society. Therefore, one could say that the point of attack should be shifted to research into the subjective conditions for the awakening of the required awareness. But the Frankfurt School expects that the untenability of the social relationships will in some way be the cause of social changes. Their final chord is pessimistic, and that in the long run has resulted in conflict with their rebellious student support.

The man who gave this unease a theoretical basis was another long-time critical Marxist, Herbert Marcuse. He said that injustice has to such an extent become part of the social structure that by now it is almost impossible to perceive it. Science—positivism—with its sober analysis of the actual relationships only functions to confirm the existing order. The day-to-day reality reflects the existing power structure and its concomitant mental attitudes so perfectly that deviant thought does not even occur. Though it looks as though people have an unlimited freedom of choice—there is even talk of an unprecedented permissiveness in moral matters—one cannot choose another type of living together, because even imagining it lies outside our range of vision. Therefore, Marcuse speaks of a one-dimensional society. People are caught in one flat plane of a continuously self-reproducing order, characterized by oppressive tolerance and supported by structural violence. In this reasoning, too, each partial improvement leads to maintaining the existing relationships. What is necessary is purposeful intolerance toward people who think differently, announcing the only true understanding and recommending a violent reversal of the existing order. But who is going to do that if people are so entangled in their one-dimensional world? This can only be done by those who to a certain extent stand outside society: the unemployed, colored people, outsiders (e.g., young intellectuals and artists) and outcasts.

According to Marcuse, a new society will be created on the ruins of capitalism, governed by the true insight, which has no place for bourgeois freedom and tolerance. Others even think that in a—they like to call it "the"—new society there will with a minimum of coercion be no oppression at all. A free and just society would, so to speak, occur "by itself" once the present property and power structures have been abolished. That is the background of social radicalism, which gained ground in the sixties. It reveals itself as an elementary force that, Marcuse says, can meet the demands of the most developed awareness of humanity. It is obvious that humanists are not going to underwrite that opinion without further ado. But it is necessary to acknowledge the relative rights of the world of critical thought as well. It is true that society is ruled by interests and that it is

defined by performance and consumption. It is true that the cultural pattern hinders a view of other possibilities and keeps people in a one-dimensional plane of existence. It is also true that enormous pressure can be exerted by the establishment under which innovations will soon crumble or degenerate. But this is not the whole truth, and neither is it true to the same extent everywhere. There are considerable differences between dictatorships and democracies. Whoever disregards this betrays that he himself is a victim of the one-dimensional vision. Moreover, humanists consider that it is an illusion to dream of a society in which no inequality of power, injustice, or pressure is experienced. That presupposes a type of human being that humanists have never met, and it obscures the view of the laborious changes that might to a large extent abolish the present evils.

Humanists are of the opinion that, as a matter of principle, it is possible for people to withdraw from the prevalent pattern and that what should be done it to create the conditions by which this is made easier in practice. The weakness of the radical critique of society is that it obstructs the view of new developments. Everything is considered spoiled by the basic evil of the society, and its unmasking tends to further a feeling of powerlessness and an escape into criticism instead of a real will to change things. In spite of everything, humanists tend to look for a chance to start new developments in the existing situation so that more people can develop their consciousness of human existence. In Marxist terminology this is called *praxis,* meaning intertwined insight and action, by which new insights create new actions; and these new actions, more and better insights. In this context one should remember that violent solutions do not at all have the efficient character they seem to possess. They cannot achieve more than whatever lives in the consciousness of people. They cannot succeed if the ruling order still has sufficient power, and once that is not the case they are often superfluous. Moreover, revolutions are not made; they take place when particular conditions exist, that is, when the situation for the large majority has become insupportable, when the conditions permit a radical improvement of the situation, when there is a sufficiently conscious group of almost powerful people who enjoy the confidence of the population—and these groups are not the ones Marcuse is talking about. Furthermore, it does not look, at least not in the Western world, as if these conditions can be easily met. Perhaps the situation in the Third World is different, but we shall have to wait and see. In any case, in that part of the world peasant revolutions, like those in Russia and China, are more probable than workers revolutions as forecast by Marx.

Most humanists will not out of hand reject violent revolutions in all circumstances and in all parts of the world. But for as long as possible they will use other means. They do not deny that tolerance is actually rather limited, but that does not mean it should be done away with, but rather it should be defended. They also do not dispute the structural pressure, nor

the violence that lies behind it, which is a reason to oppose it even more. In this context the expression *structural violence* is rather loaded language. For instance, in the Third World structural pressure can cause suffering and death, but for all that it is still not physical violence as such. The difference is experienced by those who suffer not only illness and hunger but also torture, violence, and terror. Anyway, the expression *structural violence* is not an obvious verbal justification for the use of physical violence against structural pressure even though other means are still available. This is not only a matter of morality, because nonviolent means do greater justice to human dignity, but also a matter of efficiency, because violence spoils those who exert it. How could they afterwards participate in constructing a world worthy of human beings? Our world could perish by violence: military violence, violence of civil wars, police violence, violence of terrorists, power violence, and revolutionary violence. Yet there must come a time when the vicious circle is broken, because with the present techniques of violence society risks becoming unlivable and thus irrevocably ending in dictatorship.

A belief in violence is a belief in miracles, based in almost all cases on feelings of impotence, senselessness, and isolation. It is inefficient as an expression of political terror because it throws the waverers into the arms of the opponents. It poisons the consciousness of those who use it and alienates them from social reality and from their fellow combatants. That is the reason it is so dubious as a tool of revolution; it isolates the revolutionaries. Once they have come to power they must defend themselves against their own adherents who find that enough violence has been used, then against those who had imagined that the results of the revolution would have been different, and finally against all those who do not wish to live under a regime of terrorists. There is no way back. Violence always results in more violence; there is no end to it. Those who initially had theoretically accepted the necessity for some violence are very soon the first to be liquidated, and generations of critical revolutionaries will yet share their fate. Is this view too somber, too negative? It seems until now to be confirmed by experience. That is how the indissoluble relationship between ends and means becomes obvious. The end justifying the means is not basically a morally unacceptable concept, but it goes contrary to the most elementary understanding of human praxis. The means do not stop when the end starts. In that sense it is not even possible to make a distinction between means and ends. All means continue to influence the end; each end requires suitable means. That is why humanists until the very end will appeal to human responsibility and corresponding means.

But here they meet an objection from a totally different group, namely, the structuralists. They dispute the tenability of this kind of individual view of responsibility. As a scientific method, structuralism has an importance that should not be underrated. As a matter of fact, Marxist thought also contains important structural elements. But here we are really talking about

philosophical structuralism for which Michel Foucault is a rather brilliant spokesman, though he does not want to be known as a structuralist. Structuralism as a philosophy is based on the experience that the socio-cultural structures of any historical period have such an overpowering influence on thoughts and actions of people that the cultural pattern determines their development in that period. A new period is preceded by a new cultural pattern, a new paradigm, which alters all thoughts and actions. These modifications should again not be considered as a result of conscious intervention but as the effect of the unconscious encompassing all people, of which everyone is a part without realizing it. Human thought, emotion, and action and social and historical processes only complete the unconscious happening that often has a content totally different from what the participants think. This is the reason Foucault speaks about anonymous thought (and action and emotion). But if man is what he is only because of the structure within which he functions, then man disappears from our field of vision and the socio-cultural pattern becomes the real content of our existence. According to Foucault, that is how it was until the Renaissance—he ignores the individualistic groupings since antiquity—and that is how it will be again. Individualism was a ripple on the surface of history.

The structuralist interpretation—of course it is an interpretation—seems to be representative of a realization of individual impotence when confronted with structures. In this sense it is, like the existentialism of Sartre to which it is violently opposed, an expression of individual impotence rather than of common responsibility, in spite of the fact that the structuralists are in general leftish in their opinions. Even though emotion, thought, and action are elements in a collective and partly unconscious process, this process begins over and over again and is kept going by individuals. Though the individual functions as a member of the community and possibly within given cultural paradigms, he can only function in his own way. That means that he himself must decide, even though his decisions might be less original than he thinks. The assertion that the individual is subject to the structures in which he lives can easily be rather seriously misinterpreted. It may seem to liberate him from a responsibility from which he cannot get away, namely, to be himself in a common existence. He must choose in favor of or against a structure, and among the possibilities within the structure. He cannot do anything else and that is what happens. But is it also effective? Does it matter what he chooses? After all the individual always chooses within the collective system with its rules for change in which all human expressions take place unconsciously.

How relative this idea is, is perhaps best demonstrated by means of language. Structuralism as a scientific method was first applied in the science of language, where it is still a major principle. Our speech is not random; we can only use the words and the syntax provided by the language. The meanings and relationships are predetermined. If we do not adhere to

them we are not understood, but the possibility of not adhering to them does not even occur to us. Our speech takes place in the predetermined language structure that we cannot alter in any form or manner. But this disregards the contents of speech. Yet it is the content that may be decisive for love or hatred, happiness or unhappiness, life or death. Furthermore, not only does the shape of the language govern our speech, but also our speech governs the shape of the language. There was a moment when speaking as a human activity created language, and this is a continuing process. The toddler learns his language from his surroundings, because he possesses a human language potential, namely, the capability to indicate things and name them and to relate them to each other. Aided by this the growing person interprets reality but rarely by exactly following the learned pattern. This interpretation governs his attitude, and this influences his reality. According to humanists, signs, symbols and ideas can provoke a new social interaction, provided they appeal to people. This occurs if they touch the roots of human needs. As a matter of fact, we can also see that ideas work. In the social struggle the issue is not only higher wages, but also participation. In politics it is not only a matter of power but also of justice. Survival is not only a matter of self-assertion but also of joint responsibility for posterity.

Humanists assume that ideas, which are expressions of being human in the world, are effective and that this imposes an inescapable responsibility on the individual. That is why they are skeptical with regard to all kinds of forms of systematic thought, including that of the radical social critics and the structuralists. Often they do not deny the importance of Utopia as a representation of social desires and a condition for social creativity, but they also understand its dangers if the Utopia obscures the importance of partial improvements here and now. In the same context, they see social changes as an interaction between changing relationships and human creativity rather than as a process that takes place by itself apart from the individual. That is why many humanists underline the importance of piecemeal changes. The British humanist H. J. Blackham developed a political theory based on the most thorough information concerning social reality leading to putting the required changes into practice and eventually to a revision of the starting points on the basis of the experience gained. He summarizes this empirical approach in the formula: inform, perform, reform. Organizational power is necessary for this as well, but it is not geared to destruction of the structures but to their modification. These humanists think it is an illusion to assume that it would be sufficient to destroy the existing structures in order to clear the way for what is "good," which then somehow would appear by itself. That implies the assumption that man is good by "nature" and that (present) society is just bad. But neither is entirely true.

The question is whether we still have enough time for a gradual change

of society. No one knows. The only thing that can be said is that it is an illusion to think that one road is much shorter than another. One might easily get impatient with how slowly changes take place. This, by the way, applies both to reforming and to revolutionizing government. But one should not forget that what sounds revolutionary to one generation finds general acceptance by the next. This is what happened to slavery, to the vote, to social security, and to intervention in social structures. Yet it is said that the system doesn't change, but what does that mean? If not only the content of a system changes but also its rules with regard to relationships, then it can no longer be called the same system. Property, profit motive, and participation now stand in different relationships than in the nineteenth century. This is a continuing process and results in continuing changes in the power structures. It need not be denied that from a social point of view historical privileges are rarely abandoned voluntarily, but that does not necessarily mean that the only way to obtain greater justice is to grab it by violence. As we have already seen, violence is always a precarious manner of exercising power. Humanists will in all circumstances attempt to create conditions in which other forms of exercising power can provide greater justice.

4. JUSTICE

Justice is a loaded word, calling up thoughts of a perfect order kind of floating above people's heads. That is why many people prefer the more modest sounding word *equity.* The particular content that one can give to equity as well as to justice is "equality of rights."

It is not the same as positive law—the totality of existing legal regulations—or common law or law based on precedent, because this law can be tested against equity. It is said that the highest justice can mean the greatest injustice, and that means when compared to the demands of fairness. But it is difficult to imagine equity as a kind of law of a higher order. In the same way as with morality, we are here dealing with an operator. Morality and justice are related but not the same. Both have their roots in the basic experience of being in the world with the other. But from the point of view of ethics, the other is understood as an entity, while in law he is considered as a fellow citizen. Morality means wanting to do good to him; equity means not to wrong him. What is the situation in which one does not wrong a fellow citizen? It is when, as a citizen, one allocates the same rights (and duties) to him as to all other citizens. That is equality of rights, which politically appears as equality before the law. More precisely, one can say that all citizens have the same rights and duties provided they themselves do not create conditions for unequal treatment, for instance, by misbehavior, to such an extent that it is necessary to withdraw certain rights from them.

The next problem is one that cannot be ignored by any legal community

whatever the social order within that community, namely, the attitude the community takes with regard to deviant behavior. The first requirement of the humanist interpretation of equity seems to be that deviant behavior is a matter of personal responsibility provided that it does not constitute a nuisance for other people. It may of course be damaging to the person himself but it is difficult to see what the legal grounds might be for acting against it as long as it does not disadvantage other people. As a matter of fact, this also applies to normal behavior, which after all can be damaging as well. Obviously there is a moral responsibility for one's neighbor, but it is in this very area that it is necessary to differentiate between moral concern, which basically appeals to freedom, and applying the law, which means enforcement. One of the fatal characteristics of dogmatic convictions is that they do not make this differentiation, or make it insufficiently, and thereby create an atmosphere of intolerance. Obviously, one can, when considering deviant behavior, also differentiate between healthy and unhealthy. It is obvious that this difference cannot be defined as simply as was thought previously and that in its traditional form it also has a close relationship with social patterns, but we shall at a later stage try to give a more or less defined meaning to this difference. For the moment we are considering social damage caused by such behavior and when evaluating that we shall provisionally consider the legal concept of accountability. Damaging behavior for which a person is not responsible in this sense will require measures protecting the community but also assisting the person concerned as much as possible. We might in this context think of treatment or cure without giving an opinion on any present implementation.

However, it is necessary to pay attention to accountable damaging behavior. It is clear that accountability is based on freedom of choice in the sense in which we spoke about it earlier. Even humanist determinists acknowledge a-determined-choice that expresses the responsibility of the person. Otherwise behavior furthering the community could be nothing but puppetlike, which as a matter of fact is advocated by Skinner. Accountable damaging behavior, of course, may very well be provoked by the structure of society, not only in the present structure but in other structures as well. But that can lead only to an alleviation of the judgment, perhaps even to the point of discharge. However, no society can permit damaging infringements of its order without doing anything about it, particularly because damage, very often very serious damage, can result for other people. So what good does it do us from the point of view of law to know that a murderer has had a deprived childhood. It might be considered a mitigating circumstance, but not a license. The same applies to political offenses: whoever commits the act takes the risk, and that is to a certain extent also a defense. In this respect the difference between the legal order and the moral order must always be borne in mind. An infringement of the legal order need not necessarily be immoral, nor is the opposite always the case. Yet one should

not underestimate the moral content of the legal order, because it means in all circumstances a restriction of arbitrariness and the law of the jungle. That is why Socrates after being condemned to the poison cup did not flee; maintenace of the legal order was more important to him than his own life.

But if according to the legal order someone is found guilty, what is the answer? Revenge is not permitted and, according to the humanist point of view, quite rightly, and its justification is to a large extent due to the prevention of acts of revenge and longlasting feuds. Society punishes infringements of its order, but what is the meaning of the punishment and what is its justification? We are not talking about the present forms of execution of sentences—the principle of which is now criticized, and not only by humanists—but about the character of the punishment. It can be considered as a protection of society by eliminating the person sentenced, or as a deterrent, as a measure to re-educate the guilty, or as retribution for the injustice committed. Many humanists have a tendency to appreciate the motivation of the punishment also in this same sequence, provided they do not have a tendency to find retribution in any form totally unacceptable. This is partly due to a confusion of the concepts of retribution and revenge, but partly also to a lack of clarity with regard to the humaneness of the different motivations. For particular offenses—e.g., murder because of jealousy—punishment as an educational measure will not really respect the offender as a human being but will rather diminish him, while retribution leaves his value intact, provided the execution of the punishment does not have a provocative character. And what is one supposed to do with punishment as a means of re-education for political offenses? Furthermore one wonders whether a crime of passion needs the protection of society to such an extent. That is an open question. What it does need is redress for the infringement of the legal order. Perhaps punishment can only be handled in a sensible way on the basis of the three motivations combined, and then in such a manner that the type of guilt and the character of the guilty are taken into consideration as much as possible. If one can also find meaningful humane forms of punishment, this might well be the optimum of what can be achieved in this respect in a mass society.

We now return to the subject of equity. Though little has yet been said about its content, which after all is not the purpose of these observations, what has been expressed is that equality before the law is the starting point and any inequality must be justified, not the inverse. The constitutional state is based on this starting point of equality before the law together with the related principle of security under the law. Everyone knows that political equality before the law does not provide perfect equity. This is partly due to the fact that it results in providing the same sauce for geese and ganders, who are different. People are only very relatively equal, and their equality as citizens is allocated to them because any other allocation would imply arbitrariness. But what is necessary here is correction by a

freedom that is as great as possible so that no unnecessary restrictions are imposed. Furthermore, it is obvious that equality before the law is partly undone because of social inequality. This has been mentioned earlier. But there is still no reason to belittle the importance of equality before the law. On the contrary, it should be an additional spur to improve social justice. That means striving for a situation in which all citizens have an equal say with regard to social production and an equal share in the social products, provided they themselves do not create conditions for inequality. Here again, equality is the starting point and any differences must be justified. But in this context there are possible differences in interpretation, and humanist statements in this respect are not unanimous.

First of all, the opinion is occasionally expressed by humanists that the idea of justice really should mean that everyone receives according to his needs. But apart from practical problems the question is whether here there is a confusion between moral relationships, or even affairs that are ruled by love, and social justice, which after all only requires that nobody be wronged in his capacity as a citizen. As long as there is no absolute abundance, any decision with regard to allocation according to need can easily result in arbitrariness. However, the problem of what conditions of inequality created by a person may justifiably be taken into consideration seems more difficult. Should demonstrable differences in performance be expressed when determining someone's reward? If one considers this from a personal point of view, it must be said that the capabilities of a person are not dependent on his will alone; and, if one would only wish to consider a sense of responsibility and dedication, it should not be forgotten that there may well be differences in performance though the sense of responsibility and dedication are the same. But these considerations are moral rather than legal. Therefore, it makes more sense to approach social justice from a social point of view. In that case, it motivates neither more nor less than abolition of all (environmental) obstacles to genuine equal chances of development, with all the inequality still implied by this because people use equal chances in different manners. Yet the basic similarity of people also implies that flagrant differences in property or income are not acceptable; moreover, it is permitted to consider the amount of satisfaction provided by the work as a leveling factor. Furthermore equity requires that, irrespective of capabilities and validity, nobody is prevented from developing. That has implications for the minimum wage and for the possibility to achieve continuous education and training.

This leads us to another aspect of equity, namely, the general availability of culture. In the heyday of bourgeois culture this was mainly taken to mean giving access to the highlights of that culture, in the fields of both science and art. But in these critical times, it is understood that the culture is tied to the social pattern in which it occurred. Hence, the attempt to link education to day-to-day reality and making it subservient to the awakening

of social consciousness and the flourishing of quasi ordinary design, particularly in the plastic arts. Yet one should not imagine that critical art would generally be less elitist than traditional art. Rather, the emphasis should be on a type of training that, apart from knowledge, capabilities, and skills, provides a challenge to the creative powers that can be developed. This creates conditions for self-development and creativity, which are the overall basis of any culture, though it does not mean that there would no longer be room for a cultural elite and for exceptional cultural performances. These terms have simply become suspect, because of their connection with a moneyed elite and performance society. But it would be a mistake to conclude that therefore they have lost their cultural and social meaning. There is no absolute separation between popular culture and the culture of the elite, and no really living culture can be imagined without cross-fertilization. That would also provide access to the highlights of earlier cultures, because it is not true that what is old would lose its value because of new developments.

However, it is not possible to separate this type of cultural consideration from the other forms of social life. The type of training meant here cannot be detached from our working life. It is not possible to appeal efficiently to creative self-development if a major part of daily life does not leave room for it. What we are thinking of in this context is the peculiar dehumanization of labor, which since Marx has been called "alienation." That is, as mentioned before, the products of human consciousness and action seem to start living a life of their own and even seem to turn against people. The Marxist humanists, who include Professor Markovič of Yugoslavia, have developed the most explicit thoughts in this respect. In Marxist opinion the alienation in our production system has many aspects, and according to them the situation in the "post-capitalist" countries of the Eastern bloc is the same. First of all, there is the alienation between product and labor: the product, as merchandise, disappears from the sight of the worker to provide profit for others. Because of this, there is also an alienation from one's own creative powers, because work is carried out according to rules over which the worker himself has no control. Furthermore, there is the worker's alienation from his colleagues, because they are incorporated in the same impersonal manner in a production process that is geared to ever increasing performance. And, finally, there is alienation from human nature *(das Gattungswesen),* because there is no place left in this process for the development and training of human capabilities.

According to the Marxist humanists, the situation in the so-called socialist countries is not much different, because they are controlled by a new establishment, which they call a bureaucracy. What they mean by bureaucracy is the persistent maintenance of what once was the vanguard of the people by means of a concentration of power, so that any further development of ideas is stopped at the moment the bureaucracy is

established. What the Marxist humanists oppose to this is a continuous interchange between rulers and ruled, not with regard to the practical details of policy, but with regard to the opinions on which it is based. This is why there is worker self-management in the different enterprises, which perhaps cannot totally abolish alienation but still permits a considerably greater involvement and creative work. It can work as a direct democracy in small groups and as a representative democracy in larger associations. It also implies that the management of the enterprise is hired and fired by the workers themselves and that the overall management policy of the enterprise is determined by them, though still within the framework of a national policy, because the enterprise does not work for the workers but for the community. All this does not only apply to enterprises in the narrow sense of the word but also to universities, municipalities, and other bodies. But always so that the general policy is laid down nationally by the institutions of the community and, if possible, as a matter of principle, of course also internationally. No one would say that self-management in this manner should be considered a panacea, but by distributing control and responsibility among all those directly involved it can provide a considerable contribution to realizing democracy and equity.

Until now we have mainly spoken about equity in a national context, but this is no longer enough. With our increased productivity potential and worldwide communication network, we cannot, from the point of view of equity, accept the flagrant contrasts in affluence and development possibilities in the world as a whole. The fact that two-thirds of all people are afflicted by poverty, hunger, and illness is an affront to any thought of human dignity. This problem cannot be overcome piecemeal, but requires drastic measures, both in the developing countries and in the world as a whole. Regulation of the world market seems unavoidable in this context, and this should be done in such a manner that the technically developed countries do not disproportionately profit from the lead they have already acquired. This again brings the political responsibilities of humanists to the fore, and at the same time their moral responsibilities. The latter consist of creating the inner conditions by which people will be able and willing to accept the restrictions required to create a more just world order. Obviously this does not mean that in the meantime development aid should be suspended. To the contrary, here again the same thing applies, namely, preparation should be made for the necessary major changes. One cannot sacrifice the people of today to the expectations for the future. This is the reason humanists support development aid both by governments and by private initiative. Their preference in this respect is for cooperation with autochthonous groups at a grassroots level, the main points being a respect for their own culture, training and education, and improvement of a small-scale infrastructure, with all this geared to self-help and independence.

In the long run equity on a worldwide scale is impossible without

sacrifices by the privileged, and not only the very privileged but by everyone in the rich countries who lives above the average level of subsistence. Is it possible to realize this within a framework of freedom? It just may be, if people appreciate the fact that their own interest is involved—not only because of the increasing rebellion of the Third World and the impending racial conflict, but also because the present growth economy cannot be maintained. Attempting to achieve a balance of power, a balance of production, and a balance of prosperity is only possible if one controls population growth, restrains growth, and organizes recycling of raw materials and protection of the environment. These are the conditions for a society worthy of human beings and that is the reason it is in everyone's interest, though many are unwilling to face this. Often people rely on the unscientific assumption that science will find a solution for the problem, as if science can solve all problems. The earth is finite, natural resources are finite, and the absorption capacity of the environment is finite as well. The important thing is that we respect this finiteness by giving life a sense within its confines. This also implies a choice in favor of a survival worthy of human beings. To survive as such it would be sufficient for a major part of the world population to be subject to restrictions. It might be quite possible for a dictatorship to achieve this. In earlier times it could have been done in this way, but these days the majority would not accept it, and a privileged minority could not expect to impose such an unjustifiable attitude on the world population. Why not? Because technology and mass communications spread self-assurance over the entire world, and because those same media have let all the peoples of the world come into our homes.

The humanist choice for a survival worthy of human beings means: a choice with regard to restriction and technology on a smaller scale and with less pollution, with the purpose of maintaining enough prosperity in the entire world to sustain sufficient health services, social security, and cultural development. Because well-being and prosperity are not just opposite poles, prosperity is also a condition for well-being. But in order to achieve and maintain this balance, long-term policies are necessary. We must choose within the limited possibilities that are available. As one looks around, it is almost inevitable to doubt that this is possible at all: corruption, violence, terrorism, hatred and destruction, wealth, and brute force seem to be the only factors that count. Yet these very factors are the challenge to turn the tide before it is too late. The horrible adversity of the circumstances is the very thing that makes human responsibility inevitable. That is what is meant by Emmanuel Levinas when he says that man does not choose responsibility but is already responsible, which is why he chooses liberty (human dignity). In this context humanists can play a creative role, provided they do not conform and thereby eliminate themselves. They can promote the creation of a type of man who is not geared to consumption, but to recreation; not to domination, but to collaboration. This is one of the tasks that humanists must set for themselves and others.

5. LIVING TOGETHER

The expression "living together" is used to refer to the relationship of individuals in the smaller group within the greater framework of society. These smaller groups bear the stamp of society, but they also exert considerable influence on the shape and function of that society. One thinks in this context of all kinds of organizations, working relationships, communes, circles of friends, and types of families. The smaller and more intimate the group, the less important the standard of equity and the more important that of morality, or even love. Congeniality, fellowship, affection, friendship, and love are the bases of these types of living together. They all presuppose being together in the world; but it could be said that equity is directed at living with each other, morals at living for each other, and love at being merged with each other. This is a sketchy description, but it does indicate the differences in stress. In all these relationships humanist opinions with regard to what is human operate as a guideline for the personal relationships, but in different manners depending on the intimacy of the relationship. People are always perceived as being of flesh and blood with an inner life that makes them into people. This is why they behave as fellow human beings, or as partners, with equal rights and duties, accepting the otherness of the other in critical trust. That requires reasonable consultation with regard to a common realization of aims, in which one never sees the other as only a means to an end. The important point is always making it possible for the other to be free, while realizing one's own freedom as a means of personal self-determination that is nevertheless related to others.

In relationships based on liking, friendship, and love, all the points of view mentioned increasingly become tokens of an intimate association within which everyone's freedom appears as a common freedom and everyone's self-determination as a common determination. In this type of relationship eroticism plays an increasing role. It is an attraction based on physical awareness that more or less colors all intimate relationships, giving them a peculiar gloss. Eroticism is not sexuality, and does not necessarily lead to it. If it does, it very often happens as a result of the state of being in love: a strange experience in which both of the people involved detach themselves from day-to-day reality, their existence—one must assume under the influence of sexual desires—obtaining an unusual meaning. Hair gets an unusual shine, the eyes an unusual expression, the voice an unusual sound, and the character unusual qualities. It must be assumed that people do not fall in love because of the unusualness of the qualities of the other, but that it is being in love that make these qualities so unusual. This is quite similar to the character of all personal encounters. As long as one only notices people's characteristics—that fat one, that dark one, that loud one, that clumsy one—one is not encountering them. Once that is the case, however, the qualities are seen in a different light and become, to a certain

extent, even trivial. In other words, the encounter makes a human being into something other than the sum of his characteristics.

This is not without importance when considering sexuality. Sexual contacts where an encounter hardly plays a role are of course possible and happen quite often. One may wonder if that is the sexuality that corresponds to the picture of togetherness we have sketched hitherto. One must appreciate that there is a risk that participants in that type of a relationship may use each other as a means to satisfy their biological needs. When humanists speak about sexuality, it is generally within a different context. In that case sexuality is an encounter, not only a physical encounter but, because body and consciousness are not separated, also a mental encounter. This encounter tends to engross both partners to such an extent that their lives are pushed out of their individual orbit and become intertwined. This does not necessarily happen and, if it happens, does not necessarily take place without tension or conflict. It actually provokes regret because of the threat to independence, yet at the same time creates a challenge to bring what is happening into being. The answer to this challenge is love, as a continuing responsibility for what has begun. By its own nature it is directed toward a basically permanent community of love. This is not so much a moral requirement, but it is contained in the specific nature of the sexual encounter if it is complete.

A basically permanent intimate union is called a marriage. The old word for marriage—"wedlock"—means acting on a pledge. It is no accident that this type of living together appears almost everywhere over and over again in the most different cultures. It apparently meets a widespread need that one cannot just attribute to "Christianity" or "capitalism," or the legal, social or cultural framework within which it is contained. A marriage is not made in the registrar's office but by the decision of two people. It can be an economic unit or a type of living together that is determined culturally; but it can also form part of a greater entity, such as an extended family or, in present times, a commune. Obviously it is to a large extent still controlled by traditional patterns and legal regulations, which occasionally may result in creating a straitjacket for people who live together. On the other hand, it must be admitted that living together does not take place in an abstract space, but within the context of society, which must provide social services, employment and housing, education and training. It makes sense to regulate the legal relationship between living communities and society and between the participants and their children as much as possible so that everyone's rights and duties are clear and the weak are protected against arbitrariness. According to humanists, this is the extent—the maximum extent —to which the interference of the authorities with the smaller groupings is justified.

Marriage as it is now known has developed over centuries and centuries. It was traditionally an agreement with a business background. The family

was an economic cell with an exact distribution of roles among man, wife, and children—many children. This factor still plays a role but, because of the changes in social structures, the family is also rapidly changing. The members of a family have become more independent, the family itself more open, and the structure less authoritarian. Yet it still has a considerable matter-of-fact function. But in the course of time another element, which was rarely totally absent, obtained a greater influence—namely, the love between man and wife. Particularly after the twelfth century, when the troubadours appeared, the culture of erotic love between man and woman began to develop. Under the influence of Platonic (and Christian) opinions on the separation of body and soul, the concept of love became something unattainable and no longer had much to do with sexuality. This definition of love undermines marriage, because it lacks any basis for a permanent love relationship and for this reason almost always was, and still is, sought outside marriage. These days, however, there is a trend to underline the sexuality in marriage in a very one-sided and exaggerated manner, as if it is not also a matter of care for the other, of acceptance of the other in his being different, and of feeling secure. The greater the (one-sided) expectations, the greater the risk of failure.

One often expects the impossible from a marriage. It is supposed to provide a basis for complete friendship and common interests and preferences, for permanently being in love combined with the troubador's glorification of love and the disinterestedness of altruism, topped off with complete sexual satisfaction. One cannot say that this ideal can never be achieved, but in most cases it will be a matter of attempting to make the best of it. In this context, one should not forget that in modern life both the man and the woman are continually in contact with friends and acquaintances of the opposite sex. This type of casual relationship often has an erotic aspect of varying intensity and occasionally results in a genuine sexual relationship. It would be pointless to ignore this difficult but often enriching kind of relationship. It is not really possible to give generalized opinions on the subject. It makes high demands on all of the people concerned. It does not mean a permanent breakup of the married couple unless the marriage relationship is considered to grant the right to possess the partner and unless the people concerned, because of a lack of self-confidence, feel threatened. It is of course a totally different matter if the marriage has already broken down, which can also occur when there is no third party involved. Once all interests, including those of the children, have been evaluated at their real value, the dissolution of such a marriage is not only permitted but may well be a moral requirement. Although it may cause much unhappiness, since many habitual relationships are roughly interrupted, it may open the way toward a more fruitful development than would be possible in the destructive atmosphere of a broken marriage, for the children as well. Here, again, the authorities register a divorce in the same manner they earlier registered

the marriage, and determine the legal consequences. They neither approve nor disapprove of the marriage or the divorce, but simply register the fact that it has taken place.

When dealing with marriage and sexuality, according to humanist opinion, we cannot ignore questions about having children and birth control. There is not much difference of opinion among humanists with regard to the desirability of birth control. The argument that restricting the number of children is unnatural ignores the fact that human life takes place within a culture. If that culture enables us to prolong the average life span, it at the same time imposes a duty to restrict the number of children, particularly if one wishes to give sufficient attention and care to the children in question. Sexual intercourse does not need the justification of creating a child; it has enough value in itself. Some humanists also attach great importance to the eugenic argument: that one should have children with the best talent potential; but that seems to be an overrating of the possibilities of determining this in an objective manner and an underrating of the processes that play a role when one chooses a partner. However, the world population explosion is a consideration that does count with regard to birth control, though individuals will not take their cue exclusively from that. Means to prevent undesired and undesirable pregnancies must therefore be freely available. If they fail, humanists will not reject abortion under certain conditions: the decision should be made by those directly concerned—first the mother, then the father, and also the doctor. After taking all circumstances into account, they will have to make a decision based on their conscience, which in so subtle a matter may not be subjugated to the opinions of the authorities.

Until now we have mainly spoken about marriage as the core of the small association, because until now it was the most important form and it may well remain so for a long time. But that does not mean that according to humanists there would not be a place for other relationships and other forms. Common-law marriage does not need a separate discussion, because common-law marriage is a complete marriage. And the same applies to a certain extent to homosexual relationships. Though probably for emotional reasons some humanists experience more difficulty with this, they will acknowledge on the basis of their convictions that a homosexual relationship can be an expression of full humanity and can in most respects be placed at the same level as a heterosexual marriage, also legally. A genuinely different form is the commune, made up of either all unmarried people or both married and unmarried people together. The advantages are obvious: a greater freedom of movement for parents of small children, an extension of the educational environment, and the enrichment of daily relationships. If required, a commune also offers a relaxed family situation for marriages without children, gay people, unmarried adults, unmarried mothers, and others who do not find satisfaction (anymore) in being alone or just two people together. This also provides an experiment in new forms of living

together, which might become important in the future. On the other hand, it is impossible to escape from oneself in a commune. You take yourself with you and you must find your place in the complicated relationships within the commune that in many respects require greater creativity than what is required within the nuclear family.

Until now we have been dealing with eroticism and sexuality as an expression of body awareness that can give a particular gloss and meaning to existence. Sexuality is a pervading type of encounter interwoven with sexual satisfaction. But humanists consider that the idea that sexual satisfaction in itself can provide meaning is incorrect. That idea disguises the character of human sexuality as much as the prejudice that sexual satisfaction should be something inferior. If one wishes to compare the sexual drive with a hunger that must be satisfied, the difference is that in this case it is not a matter of something one can simply devour but of someone with claims and desires equal to our own. In the areas of sexuality, marriage, and communal relationships, the claims of equality, self-determination, and relatedness must also be made, and role patterns must be adapted. However, it is impossible to lay down fixed behavior guidelines for this. There is insufficient reason for considering the traditional female and male roles as unchanging; nor should one try to reverse them in every respect. An open marriage is a marriage in which the partners do not impose themselves on each other. This type of marriage is also more prone to confrontation with the problems of relationships with third parties; however this does not at all mean that it would thereby be destroyed. Some women would like to have a husband but no children, or a child but not a husband. Humanists will attempt to search for solutions that would give full allowance for being human in each one of these situations.

It is strange how little of all this is discussed at school. Yet it, too, is a part of life that must be learned. What young people need is not so much clever lessons, but rather an environment in which they can be completely human and in which the sexual aspects of life are connected in a matter-of-fact way with everything that is valuable to people. This will enable sexuality to lose its separate dark corner and to become a part of the structure of existence. Secrecy easily leads to inhibition, which for many people is the cause of rigidity, aggression, and even brutality. This in turn leads frequently to opinions defining morality as what is permitted or not in the area of sexuality. On the other hand, it would be wrong to present sexuality as just a biological process in which encounter and devotion hardly play a role. This has little to do with training. Sexual education cannot be detached from education in general. The insight that man is a unity makes the idea of a separate sexual education questionable. It ought to be a part of general education toward maturity, more of a guide for young people concerning their experiences of life than recommendations for a determined course of action. Yet any type of guidance also contains an element of direction,

because the educator will try to understand immature experiences from the point of view of his own experience and his own insights about life. In this context, however, it must be clear that the young person cannot yet have made this experience and insight his own.

This has brought us to a subject that in this section about living together requires some separate attention, namely, education and training. Education is an essential element of humanist philosophy. Even in the remote past education covered much more than just schooling. *Paideia* meant a concept of life within which people were supposed to reach true humanity by a continuous, permanent, active participation in the learning process of life. This has remained so, and moral education is still an important part of humanist activities. It would be instructive to consider the entire area of humanist interest from this point of view: the meetings and discussion groups in one's own circle, taking a point of view and influencing outsiders, and humanist counseling of individuals and groups. All attempts to make the humanist image of man and his world functional within reality really come under this old concept of *paideia.* But for our purpose we will pay particular attention to education and training in the narrower sense. The starting point in this respect is that people can be educated. That means that they can learn. But what does learning mean? Occasionally it is considered to be nothing but training, habituation, conditioning. People are then compared with Pavlov's dogs. But Köhler's monkeys demonstrated something quite different. After some trial and error, they pushed one bamboo stick into another to make one long enough to reach a banana that had been lying out of their reach outside the cage. That was not a matter of training but of discovery.

Obviously humanists stress the second type of learning, which occurs among the higher animals and has become the most important type of learning for people. After a number of attempts by trial and error, one suddenly discovers something—a sudden insight, something one did not understand at all that is suddenly understood. This is not a gradual experience, but a spontaneous event. Association of experiences and images does play a role in this context, but the actual learning experience is purposeful. It presupposes a creative moment of arranging and combining data into a new entity, a new understanding, a new insight that results in a new attitude, a new praxis. That is the type of learning that is meant in humanist training, though available knowledge and even training in skills is necessary for this as well, because apart from action and experience they supply the basic material to create insights. But real learning is a creative activity that involves the person totally. It is obvious that this freedom cannot be unlimited. It takes place within a situation, and that situation presents a challenge. Teaching or training consists of making this challenge visible, because the agogue structures the situation. It is a mistake of totally anti-authoritarian agogics to leave the learning person with a jumble of

unstructurable possibilities in which he has a fair chance of losing his way. This leads to disorganization and discouragement: it is where agogics fails. Society fails in the same manner if the various possibilities of its members cannot be structured.

Agogics is the teaching and learning of skills, offering elements of knowledge, and giving shape to situations by which learning people are enabled to confront challenges and master them. The actual purpose of agogics is to make itself superfluous, but it does not achieve this purpose if it presupposes its superfluousness at the outset of an agogic process. This is a stance between two extremes of agogics: one is that of unrestrained development; the other that of training according to a predetermined model. Learning people, and the same applies to children, are not matter that can be shaped by the teacher according to his preferences. On the other hand, it is assumed that the teacher will be effective in fulfilling their learning needs. This learning refers to experience, observation, acquisition of knowledge, evaluation, and action. An agogic process within which these elements do not all occur is one-sided. Although in our culture the value of knowledge has for a long time been determined in a one-sided manner, this is no reason for humanists to underrate knowledge. It has actually an important function as a means of finding one's way in reality, of supplying the building stones for a world orientation, and of contributing by its disciplinary and intersubjective character to the shaping of the personality. But this should not imply any disparagement of emotional learning processes directed at appreciation. People are evaluating beings and education is to a large extent supporting them on their way to discerning between beautiful and ugly, good and bag, true and untrue.

In the agogic process the person of the agogue plays an important role. Without mutual sympathy education is not possible, not even in group situations in which the agogue or trainer withdraws as much as possible. In difficult circumstances the sound personality of a teacher has a supporting power that is obscured by many theories. It provides him, whether he wants it or not, with moral authority based on his devotion, his preparedness to be accountable, his capacity to listen, and his willingness to leave the other with as much as he can take. But group processes, too, are of invaluable importance for learning people. In the first years of one's life this consists mainly of a family or a commune. By common action and experience, by the distribution of tasks and cooperation, the child is placed in a small community within which it can socially develop according to its own character. Within this situation it finds mainly protection, so that its urge toward activity and meeting his desires finds a protective environment within which it experiences obvious understanding for its failings and security against its fears. Without burdening children too much, their participation in taking responsibility can have the best chances in a small community and can provide a spur for their social development. School education can link up with

this. The school is an educational unit as well and, though it has its own task, can only fulfill it in a meaningful manner within the network of structures within which people must mature.

These days the school stands between the devil and the deep blue sea: as a social institution it has a tendency to transmit and perpetuate the existing social situation; on the other hand there is an attempt to make the school into an instrument for establishing a particular different social order. But in both cases the young learner is manipulated for purposes not aimed at his training as such. All training will have to take place in the awareness of the developing social changes and be directed at human dignity, which hardly corresponds to the present pattern of performance, consumption, and alienation. Still this does not mean that schools should propagate definite social opinions, whether conservative or revolutionary. Its duty is to assist students in obtaining information with regard to conservative and alternative concepts of society, with regard to the rich and the poor, peace and war, democracy and dictatorship, socialism and liberalism. Social training cannot be detached from training as a human being, which is directed at obtaining the knowledge, experience, and skill that permits dealing with new situations and problems in a manner that furthers self-confidence and a sense of responsibility and can thereby prevent feeling afraid and impotent. In this context the school as a living community can also fulfill an educational role, because parents, teachers, pupils, and the "competent authorities" are given participating and self-governing tasks.

It seems inevitable that the school has a role to play. Though pleas are made for de-schooling, it is meant in a corrective sense. These pleas are based partly on an underestimation of the knowledge accumulated in the course of generations, which one can hardly obtain in practice, and are perhaps also an expression of a lack of appreciation of the historical character of a culture. On the other hand, though, the de-schooling idea is based on the correct insight that practice is the best teacher, at least in some respects. However, it cannot be structured for learning; it often provides one-sided knowledge, and it only partially contributes to shaping the person. This is why the school remains an important place.

This again leads us to the matter of training in what is called the third environment: society as a whole; life in practice. The rapid changes create a need for continuous training. Institutes of all kinds can play a role in this respect, but daily experience and the mass media also provide a never-ending stream of information. Yet this in itself does not contribute to training. To the contrary, it works in a disorienting and frightening way, so that one tries to ignore information as much as possible. This is not the case only if people have learned to arrange information according to human and social patterns. Only then can they do something with it. Information works only in a framework that offers perspectives, and training really means enabling people to shape that framework freely so that they learn to process information as an aid in practical life.

6. SELF-DETERMINATION

Living together is in humanist terms the living together of independent individuals. Yet it is not very clear what the self within this independence really stands for. If one does not postulate it a priori, it does not appear. For the human sciences it is initially something intangible. They know about drives and instincts, biological functions and expressions of consciousness, behavior patterns and roles, but they never meet the self. In this they obviously do an injustice to a fundamental experience of existence, namely: I am the one who functions in reality. From a scientific point of view one might continue in two different ways: either assume that the experience of the self is an illusion, without corresponding reality, or arrange scientific knowledge from the point of view of the self. In the first case, man disappears out of sight. In the second, he acts as the binding principle of his separate functions. These functions can then be better understood, and they also obtain a different meaning. In this manner science meets the existential experience, which is its basis, in a more satisfactory manner. One should never forget that, when it is a matter of existential facts, science cannot produce more than what is contained in its presuppositions. It "proves" its own starting points.

The awareness of the self is based on the knowledge of being together with others in this world, prior to reflection. This "being in the world" is mainly based on looking. Pointing out is connected with looking and pointing out leads to seeing. By this we get more or less familiar with the world as a world of objects in a certain relationship. The being "with others" is based more on hearing. Hearing permits listening and listening leads to understanding. Hereby one experiences being together: man discovers himself by reference to the other, yet in such a manner that he recognizes the possibility of a self, a center of arrangement, for the other as well. This discovery is not so much supported by looking, by the kind of look that discovers things, but rather by seeing a shape that expresses a relatedness. But even this seeing remains external if it is not accompanied by hearing what is expressed and particularly listening to what is expressed: the self. The self, also one's own self, wants to be listened to in silence. Only then can it reveal a coherence within instability: the identity of the self. These days a lot is being said about "identity." But what does it really consist of? And what is wrong with the identity if one speaks about a "crisis of identity"? How can one speak about the identity of a person, which after all is subject to continuous change?

Identity as absolute equality—which is what is expressed by the root word *idem,* "the same"—is a contradiction in itself. The here and now is different from the there and then, at least with regard to the lapse of time; and this is particularly true for living beings. I am today not the same person I was yesterday. If I see a photo of myself as a child, my reaction is:

"Haven't I changed." But if I am speaking about change, there is something that changes but within that change remains itself. Even the expression, "I am a totally different person from what I was at the time," presupposes an identity that at that time expressed itself quite differently from how it does now. What is that identity in the permanent relationship with its environment and the graduality with which it changes? What is it that appreciates these relations and their changeability? One could situate this "something" in the brain cells, but it would still remain an open question how it operates. This function consists in a capability that never totally identifies with the world, not even its own internal world, but that is capable of keeping a certain distance and, because of this, is in a position to discern elements and create a cohesion between them. It works because it allocates a relationship of difference or similarity to the expressions and relationships of the I it was then and the I it is now. In a similar way one also allocates an identity to other beings (and things) that makes concepts like role expectation, role behavior, and role pattern more comprehensible. A sense of identity is supported by the clarity and the relatedness of the social roles within which one lives, but it does not get entirely absorbed in these roles. On the contrary, they can only be understood from the point of view of a sense of identity. It is not the role patterns that are the foundation of identity but the sense of identity that permits the perception of roles.

Identity is an expression of the integrated person in the cohesiveness of his expressions and relationships. It is not predetermined or imposed by others or by society, but it is something formed by man himself, and therefore it provides him with a certain amount of independence. This is why he is better able to withstand the disintegration of his personality, which can easily occur in present society with its rapid changes. The old behavior patterns do not work anymore, and it is necessary to create new ones for oneself. However, their consistency is often unclear and this can lead to confusion of roles and to disorientation. As a matter of fact, disorientation can have a useful function. It can be an expression of liberation from antiquated and inefficient frameworks and thus create space for renewal. But it can also lead to inner chaos and alienation from the self, the other, and society. The main problem is not whether disorientation occurs, but whether the sense of direction is affected. If the sense of direction remains intact, it will be possible to recapture the sense of identity under one's own power. This sense of direction has to do with the capability to provide the events of existence with a cohesion whereby they can be arranged into a varied life. This capability to provide meaning is supported by one's view of life. The realization of it enables man to develop and, if necessary, modify a specific attitude of mind from an orientation pattern within which the experiences of his life can find their place.

In a way everyone has a view of life. Generally it is in the unconscious; not the subconscious, because the content of the subconscious is not

available without effort. It can appear unexpectedly, or it can be made available by using certain techniques. The contents of the unconscious are available, but are not yet conscious or are not anymore. For instance, when writing one uses the rules of spelling without being aware of it. Since these rules are available, they are not in the subconscious. As soon as one starts wondering about spelling, one starts thinking about the rules, which then move from unconsciousness into consciousness. The same applies to a view of life. In critical situations one is aware of what one considers essential, but it is only then that one becomes fully conscious of it—not as a system of principles, but in its optimum form as a convergence of a sense of identity and direction, grafted on notions about man and his world that justify talking about a moral conviction. This can provide a peculiar inner assurance, which we shall call self-confidence. Its function is not unimportant. A weak self-confidence is reflected in considerable dependence on the relationships within which one lives. Conformism is strong in that case, even in nonconformist groups: It is necessary to spend so much energy on the attempt to be somebody, e.g., by identifying with one's leaders, that there is nothing left for creativity in general or in relationships with others. In that case one lives in an authoritarian pattern even in an anti-authoritarian environment. To the outside world this is generally expressed by a remarkable uniformity of appearance, behavior and customs. Strong self-confidence, on the other hand, permits reactions to reality in an original and efficient manner depending on time and place.

A self-confident man is not afraid to stand alone and does not feel the need to force his way of life down the throats of other people. Nor will he make frantic attempts to be different from others. He has energy to spare to mean something to other people without denying himself. He is capable of accepting himself with his limitations and potential. Nothing is so destructive for self-confidence and paralyzing for fruitful activity as wanting to do the impossible. It leads to flight reactions and omnipotence fantasies that in reality do not achieve anything. This is something we often see in both personal and social life. Acceptance, on the other hand, is not resignation but a reconciliation with one's own being and that of others as a starting point for change. Human existence is by nature living with changes, but the question is whether these changes just happen to us or whether we can find our place within them. People must give shape to their lives by means of making decisions within a given framework, on the basis of a sense of identity, a sense of direction, and self-confidence. The point is for their decisions to give their lives a direction that can provide them with a sense of purpose that makes living worthwhile. That is what could be called self-determination. It does not mean that people are masters of their fate, but that in spite of it they take themselves in hand in this confusing and incomprehensible world.

This idea of self-determination is very close to what Abraham Maslow calls self-actualization and includes a sense of purpose that is present in

Maslow's definition. It is known that Maslow bases his psychology on the growth potential with which human beings appear in the world. This growth directs his development, provided the conditions are favorable. The first requirement for this is to meet the bodily needs, including those for security and protection, recognition, and respect. Maslow calls these the deficiency needs, which must be met from outside. But the better these are satisfied, the more space there is for "growth requirements," as they are called by Maslow: the need for creativity and understanding, for self-realization, and for peak experiences. And this growth leads to self-actualization, which means becoming what one potentially can be. People who have grown to this point are characterized by sounder relations with reality, by acceptance of themselves and others, by spontaneity and naturalness, by attention to the world outside themselves, by a need for privacy and independence, by inner certainty, and an openness for mystical experiences. They have a strong sense of community, close friendships, and complete love, a genuinely democratic character structure, a sound sense of good and evil, and a tendency to perceive things as relative. But they are not perfect, whatever that may be. They too have stupid habits; they can be stubborn, boring, irritating, vain, and hot tempered; they too know weakness, guilt, fear, sadness, and strife. This is why they may be likeable.

Self-determination presupposes self-love; this means that one considers oneself worth loving. Usually all moralists tell people what they already know—namely, that they should love their neighbor—but the problem is how to do it. Well, one of the first conditions for this is to learn to love oneself. This does not at all lead to egotism; on the contrary, it leads the way to a realization that any person can be worth loving and that this is not dependent on a balance of his good and bad characteristics. This can even lead to friendship and love, occasionally to liking, but it always provides a basis for respect of other people's self, even if one must disapprove or even fight their inclinations or actions. Yet self-love and the ensuing openness to others can rarely or never tear the veil that separates oneself from another; this hardly ever happens even in complete love, though it might get close to it. Being together in the world still does not mean being one in the world. Deep in himself, a person can be lonely, and it is his very self-acceptance and self-determination that enable him to accept it and even to draw unexpected force from it. Occasionally he must turn back to the hidden self, to where the roots of time do not reach. But even then he need not be alone, because his loneliness is an experience shared by others.

Self-acceptance also leads to acceptance of the world. This does not mean resignation, but rather learning to live ready for battle with the unimaginable misery that we ourselves and nature bring to people. Whoever has not found himself is crushed by suffering; his actions bear the stamp of desperate belief in miracles, his rigidity undermines his vitality. He is not any more capable of accepting the healing power of small things, social

relations, the reconciliation of art, the spaciousness of nature. He is harassed by the alienating dissatisfaction that can be observed in many people these days. The same applies to one's own suffering. Yet humanists will not close their eyes to human failings. The tragic aspect of existence is that good intentions can have very undesirable results, and one cannot escape from this tragedy by shifting attention from meanings to acts, or even to results, because even supposedly good results can lead to unpredictable consequences. This does not excuse anyone from a duty to act as responsibly as possible, but we must be aware of the relativity of our insight. Moreover we must still consider the guilt one must shoulder because of acting wrongly or because one has lost one's way. Life can lead people through vales of sadness that they could not possibly have imagined in happier days. In that case, they are thrown back on themselves—but we hope not left by themselves—and on the healing power of their relationship with the world.

The self must always be prepared for suffering, because it is a part of life. Even if one thinks that in a future society there will be more solidarity and peace, and that hygiene and technology will increasingly control illness and the forces of nature, even then the unpredictable will always cause new suffering and threaten those near us. Inflicting suffering is even in the best human relationships occasionally unavoidable. Suffering is to such an extent part of life that it can happen to anyone. As a matter of fact, it is perplexing, if one considers it collectively or individually, that almost no one ever gets what he deserves. It looks as if suffering hits people at random. It is said that suffering chastens people, but one could hardly maintain that the people who need chastening most are the ones who are actually made to suffer. And anyway suffering can only chasten them if it is fully integrated and fitted in the totality of existence. Suffering is a warning that people should handle each other carefully in order to remove the social causes of suffering and to make both suffering and existence more bearable for one another. Perhaps the only sense in suffering is that it shows us a new quality of life, that we learn to understand joy and only appreciate it against the background of suffering, in the same way in which life cannot really be experienced without the background of death. This is the way in which it is only the relatedness of life and death, joy and suffering, that creates the reality of existence without which it would seem unreal to us.

Similarly death can be the fulfillment of life once all talents have been developed and life gets to its ebb-tide. This is the reason that the death of young people by violence, accident, and illnesses is so insupportable. It must be recognized, however, that existence is at all times proceeding toward one's own death and that everyone's existence is subject to it at any moment. Only if a person is fully aware of this can he experience it in its unique unrepeatability. If one looks at it from this point of view, the idea of immortality is not so very attractive; it is a life without necessity in which each challenge can for all eternity be met once again. The sense of death

lies in the finiteness of life with its inescapable suffering, its invaluable joys, and its unrepeatable development. Within this development, the self experiences the relatedness with something that surpasses it: the family, a circle of friends, work, or culture, in which a durable form of life manifests itself. And this contains part of its meaningfulness, self-determination beyond the limits of the self, functionality in a greater whole, which can reconcile people with finiteness, even if they have only been moderately successful in playing their role. Here again we are meeting self-acceptance, not as an addition of good and bad characteristics, but as a unique link in a network. It can fill the finiteness of existence with intensity, creativity, and direction from which springs the insight that one has not lived for nothing.

This is the context within which one should speak about euthanasia. It is not a matter of suicide in the usual sense—we shall deal with suicide later. Euthanasia is the choice of a good death once one's physical and mental powers are failing as a result of fatal illness. Here, too, humanists want man himself to decide, as long as he can decide, or based on what he was fully convinced of at the time he was still capable of being convinced of it. It is not the interests or the mental stamina of the surroundings, but the wish of the individual that is the salient point. It is similar to abortion in that it is a matter between patient and doctor that does not concern society directly. It does concern it indirectly, however, to the extent that it must provide safeguards against euthanasia being misused. The only yardstick must be that the interest of the patient may to the best of one's knowledge not be infringed. This also means that someone who has permanently lost consciousness does not need to be resuscitated. Though this does provoke some medical problems, these are more scientific than ethical and therefore must be solved scientifically. For humanists the self-determination of a person will always be the main argument, provided there still is self-determination. It must be respected if someone, because of his sense of relatedness with the whole of existence, wishes to bear his sufferings to the end; but in the same sense someone may also choose to end an individual existence that no longer enriches existence as a whole.

This idea of being related to the whole of existence leads us to consider a religious feeling that also occurs in humanist expression. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it is necessary to state first of all that we are not talking about a sense of individual immortality, and even less about a belief in a personal God. One should rather think of one of the original meanings of the word *religere,* in the sense of being awed. What it means is that people can stand in awe of the world and realize that they don't have it in their pocket. A sense of the oneness of all that is, including man, also plays a role in this context. How can one discuss this religious feeling further? Day-to-day reality is the result of a common interpretation of existence. It has a contemplative character, though it can be the source of profound experiences. It is possible to put this contemplative reality, as it were, between

brackets and to open one's self to the existential value of being. That is a manner of experience that often occurs even within one's daily life; we have mentioned it before. When experiencing music or a poem or simply in a personal relationship or surrounded by one's day-to-day reality, man can all of a sudden be gripped by a sense of extension that blurs the standard boundaries and by which the situation is experienced in the context of an unusual wholeness. This might give a person a sense of ecstasy: a sense of standing outside the normal reality of day-to-day living.

These feelings can be evoked by meditation, mental exercise to exclude daily reality, but they can also just happen. They do not cause a kind of dreamlike condition but, to the contrary, very often go together with an extraordinary clarity of sensory perception and mental wakefulness, through which things get a new meaning and cohesion. Individuality is reduced and one may get a feeling of being one with existence. It is not a condition within which one obtains new knowledge, but whoever experiences it, even if only in passing and as an accidental moment in the daily routine, feels renewed and strengthened by it as well as challenged to renewed creativity and belonging. But he also feels able to stand up better against the vicissitudes of life, because he thinks that he has sensed something of the relativity of daily happenings. This does not lead him to resignation, but provides him with an inner force to continue his defense of human dignity within day-to-day reality. Yet religious feeling is not a moral category; its justification does not lie in its moral usefulness, and it is quite possible to draw moral strength from other sources. Furthermore, one cannot blame anyone for not knowing or accepting religious experiences. This is not a moral deficiency, though a religious humanist might think that such a person short-changes himself. But here we are in an atmosphere in which rational argumentation has no power of conviction; so it is better to be silent about it after all.