THE IDEA OF SECULARISM AND THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

JUSTICE AFTAB ALAM
The Idea of Secularism and the Supreme Court of India

Justice Aftab Alam
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>The Idea of Secularism and the Supreme Court of India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Justice Aftab Alam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keywords</td>
<td>Secularism, Constitution, India, minority rights, community based rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category in Working Paper series</td>
<td>A – academic research paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments can be sent to</td>
<td>To the editors of the Pluralism Working Paper series – <a href="mailto:pluralismworkingpapers@uvh.nl">pluralismworkingpapers@uvh.nl</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Website</td>
<td><a href="http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/judges/bio/sitting/aftabalam.htm">http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/judges/bio/sitting/aftabalam.htm</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Justice Aftab Alam is Judge at the Supreme Court of India.
The Pluralism Working Paper series

Welcome to the *Pluralism Working Paper series* for the Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Programme. The series provides a vehicle for early dissemination of knowledge and aims to reflect the broad range and diversity of theoretical and empirical work that is undertaken by academic researchers and civil society based development practitioners in association with the Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Programme.

The Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Programme (PPKP) is carried out in an international cooperative structure that includes the Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Hivos) and the Kosmopolis Institute of the University for Humanistics, both in the Netherlands, the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society (CSCS, Bangalore, India), the Center for Religious and Cross Cultural Studies (CRCS, Yogyakarta, Indonesia) and the Cross-Cultural Foundation of Uganda (CCFU, Uganda).

The working paper series is intended to stimulate discussion and critical comment on a broad range of issues addressed in the knowledge programme and contains publications in three categories:

A. academic research (-in-progress) papers  
B. practice-based reflections  
C. interviews and conversations

To orient different target groups of readers, each paper will be listed in one of these categories.

We welcome feedback and encourage you to convey your comments and criticisms to the working paper series editors and directly to the authors.

For more information about the Hivos Knowledge programme initiative please visit www.hivos.net and the Kosmopolis page on the University for Humanistics home page at www.uvh.nl

On behalf of the international Promoting Pluralism Programme staff, we thank you for your interest in our working papers.

Caroline Suransky, Hilde van ‘t Klooster and Ute Seela  
Editors of the *Pluralism Working Paper series*
### Table of Contents

The Pluralism Working Paper series  
Editor’s preface

---

**The Idea of Secularism and the Supreme Court of India**  
Brief introduction to India’s pluralism  
Example of a recent proceeding before the Supreme Court  
I Pluralism and Minority Rights  
II Ascendency of the Monoculturist View  
III Dilemmas of Reformist Interpretations  
ANNEXURE: Constitution of India
Editor’s preface

Over the last three decades, many ideas that form the basis of modern democratic societies, such as civil society, citizenship, human rights and freedoms, secularism and tolerance have come under severe scrutiny. These ideas are challenged from sites of practice as well as from academic perspectives. In the field of academics, both the critical currents of thought within the Euro-American world and the body of work that came to be identified as postcolonial studies provide reference points. Within the realm of practice, the taxonomy of ‘civil society’ drastically changed during the last couple of decades. Many new players such as new religious movements, new organisations from within religious communities and women’s movements around the theme of faith in various religions stand as useful examples in this regard.

A growing, complex and influential body of critical writings contends two basic things. Firstly it argues that these concepts in their ‘normative’ constructions, are often either epistemically inadequate or even incorrect, and therefore untenable for rigorous empirical scrutiny in cross-cultural settings. Examples here are Talal Asad’s work on Secularisation in Europe, or the work of William Connolly on Pluralism and democracy, and the postcolonial scholarship on democracy in the non-west. Secondly, it illustrates that numerous social and institutional practices, that emerge both from civil society interventions and the state, tend to stand as ‘deviations’ from the normative, though their intended purpose is to address similar concerns to the rationale for which such norms were created. The ‘inconsistency’ in the interpretations of some of these core concepts in juridical literature, as demonstrated by Justice Alam’s paper, is illustrative of the impossibility of the realisation of the norm in its pure form.

The Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Program (PPKP) initiates critical dialogue on the role of secularism and the secular state in shaping democratic social relations, which is at the heart of the above debate. In the wake of the global phenomenon of religious revivalism, long-standing assumptions about the role of the state in secularising the social fabric have arisen. Different secular dispensations such as the ‘doctrine of the wall of separation’ or ‘equal respect’, ‘equal distance’ or ‘measured distance’ from religions, have come under severe challenge. With no exception, all major religions of the world, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism, including its sub-denominations and some new sectarian movements, currently witness growing inclinations towards a more centralised control of their religious orientations. This arguably could lead to fundamentalist tendencies.

A key concern in this regard is the role of the state in maintaining social cohesion, coexistence and peace in increasingly plural societies. Needless to mention that all modern societies are multicultural and are likely to become more complex given the growing movement of people across jurisdictions. Given these developments, what kind of new secular orientations are needed to create and manage social cohesion and peace? What happens if the unquestionable, and hence hegemonic, status that has been given to state-driven secular frameworks becomes too vulnerable and inadequate to address the democratic concerns of multicultural populations? What role can institutions, especially judicial institutions and civil society organisations, play in mediating the contemporary secular challenges to assure newer forms of social cohesion in modern societies?

These and related questions have become central to many countries across the world. In Europe for example we witness debates on freedom of expression and the experience of insult. We also see a vibrant dialogue on the public display of religious symbols in western societies, particularly with reference to Islamic head scarves. In the Middle East there is a focus on minority rights, gender and religious freedom issues. In Asia and Africa we observe a focus on minority rights combined with ethnicity, gender or caste issues, as well as debates within religious communities about ‘liberal’ versus ‘radical’ beliefs.
Given these shifting realities, how can judicial systems respond and intervene? In all the above mentioned societies, the role of the higher courts as mediators of the democratic concerns of various religious communities has become critically important. Since they often enjoy considerable popular legitimacy, these higher courts are challenged to achieve complex balancing acts that help to enhance social cohesion amidst diversity. In this context, the Knowledge Program team decided that a study of the Supreme Court in India could be highly relevant since its long-standing and rich experience can illuminate many of the contemporary concerns on secularism elsewhere.

The current paper on “The Idea of Secularism and the Supreme Court of India” by Justice Aftab Alam, a sitting honourable judge of the Supreme Court of India, is critically important for this reason. India has an unbroken record of being a working democracy for over six decades, and a proven record of judicial autonomy with powers of judicial review. In addition, it became known for its ‘judicial activism’ since the beginning of the 1980s.

The Supreme Court of India had to address, among others, issues of secularism from the very beginning of the independent constitution. Justice Alam’s perceptive and insightful paper lucidly presents this long history of judicial engagement regarding questions of secularism as they emerged over time in India. Although the paper primarily draws from the judgements of the Supreme Court of India, it also provides a larger analytical grid when referring to decisions of the Apex Court on minority issues. Justice Alam’s observations could be significantly important for other democratic societies and are interesting to compare to emerging experiences elsewhere in the world.

Apart from these macro comparisons, the experience of the courts and court decisions in India could have significance for civil society organisations and their interventions both within India and beyond. Dealing with the issues of legal pluralism, and addressing concerns of balancing minority rights with individual freedoms are most relevant in our current times.

Dr. Caroline Suransky,

Chief editor of the Pluralism Working Paper series for the Promoting Pluralism Knowledge Programme

The editor thanks Prof. Sitharamam Kakarala and Ms. Sruti Chaganti from the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society (CSCS) in Bangalore, India and Prof Henk Manschot from the Kosmopolis Institute of the University for Humanistic Studies, the Netherlands, for their critical involvement in conceptualizing this preface and editing the paper.
The Idea of Secularism and the Supreme Court of India

Justice Aftab Alam

In this paper I propose to present a perspective on the role of the Supreme Court of India in upholding the ideal of secularism while balancing the interests of a deeply plural society like India. I will try to cover, very broadly, three areas; one concerning community based rights or minority rights and how in recent years the Court has tended to give priority to individual rights and freedom over community based rights; two how the Court has perceived secularism and how in some of its later decisions it has tended to take a mono-culturist rather than a pluralist view of secularism and third, how the Court has tried to regulate the State’s intervention in religious affairs and in the process has itself assumed a highly interventionist role.

Brief introduction to India’s pluralism

India is home to eight major religions of the world. The Constitution of India recognizes twenty two languages as ‘official’ Indian languages. Indians speaking the same language may belong to different religions. Conversely, Indians belonging to the same religious group may come from different ethnic stocks, may speak different languages, dress differently, eat different kinds of food in entirely different manners and may have completely different social and economic concerns. In India religion, a welfare State and secularism overlap and combine to make a highly interesting and unique kind of society.

Some examples

There are six different ways, sanctioned by law, in which an Indian, depending on his or her religion, can get married. The one mode of solemnization of marriage that applies to all Indians irrespective of religion\(^1\) finds favour with very few, mostly in cases where the spouses come from different religious groups.

The vast body of law dealing with property rights treats two Indians differently, again depending upon their religion.

---

\(^1\) Besides the recognised personal laws governing civil matters of various religious groups, that is, Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Parsis, there is the Special Marriage Act (1954) that provides opportunity for anyone who may wish to marry outside the personal law framework. The matters of marriage, inheritance, custody of children etc are governed differently under each law, largely derived from principles of religious orientations of these groups.
On my death the devolution of my estate upon my heirs will take place in a way completely different than in case of my Hindu friends.

Among Hindus there is the concept of joint family. It is quite inseparable from the Hindu way of life. The institution of Hindu undivided family or joint family is woven into a number of laws with the result that those laws affect different people quite differently.

In several States the Land Reforms Act that imposed ceiling on individual land holdings impacted a Muslim landholder far more adversely than a Hindu landholder in similar circumstances.

In 1964 Pope Paul VI came to India when the 38th Eucharistic Congress was held in Bombay at the Oval Maidan opposite the Bombay High Court. The Pope refused to go to Delhi but the President and the Prime Minister of the republic came to Bombay to greet him. The State of Maharashtra provided all the facilities for holding the Congress².

For every Muslim going for Haj³, the Government of India spends, from the tax-payers money, a substantial amount as air fare subsidy. In the Government of India budget for the year 2009-10 a sum of rupees 632 crores (approximately 100 million Euro) is allocated as Haj Subsidy¹.

Kumbh Mela or the fair of the nectar pot takes place four times every twelve years when millions of Hindu pilgrims congregate to take the holy dip in the river on a single day. The next fair is to take place in 2010 in Haridwar where the Ganges comes down into the plains. The State of Uttarakhand would spend an estimated amount of Rs.500 crore (approximately 80 million Euro) for organising the Mela. Besides the Kumbh there would be at least a dozen purely religious festivals where direct government spending would run into billions of rupees.

Amidst all this a majority of Indians honestly believe that they live in a secular country. And they feel quite comfortable in that thought.

From the random illustrations presented before you it is not very difficult to see the position of religion and the nature of secularism under the constitutional scheme in India. As regards religion, the Constitution of India provides a model that was inspired by the near perfect lived experience of perhaps one of the greatest Indians of all times. For, who could be more deeply religious and at the same time more secular than Mohandas Gandhi himself?

The Indian Constitution, unlike the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, does not have any provision that prescribes the making of any law respecting an establishment of religion. It recognizes religion as a source of law. With a view to protect minority rights, it confines affirmative social and cultural rights on religious groups. It guarantees the freedom of religion but enables the State to regulate religious practices on certain limited grounds. Thus under the Indian Constitution secularism involves a plural establishment of religion with the State maintaining a principled distance or, as some call it, equidistance from all religions. The Court is called upon, in a variety of ways, to oversee and regulate the principled distance that the State ought to keep from religious establishments and the nature of State intervention permissible in religious affairs.

---

² Reporting about the Congress, The Time, London of December 4, 1964 wrote: “Portuguese anger is mild compared to that of some right-wing Hindu groups, which look upon the congress as a colonialisit plot to destroy the culture of India. There are blunt posters on the street of Bombay warning that “Christianity is a danger to Hinduism.” Indian officials minimized the threat to the Pope, but put a number of Hindu fanatics in protective custody and strengthened the 16000-man Bombay police force with 3000 troops from the Maharashtra State police.

³ The Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islam, is the annual pilgrimage to Mecca which every adult able-bodied Muslim who can afford it must undertake.

⁴ Some Muslim groups though argue that the huge subsidy is in reality to the national carrier because the pilgrims are not allowed to take any airline other than Air India.
Example of a recent proceeding before the Supreme Court

A Muslim boy was expelled from a school run by Christian missionaries for keeping a beard in contravention of the rules framed by the school authorities. For keeping the beard the boy invoked Article 25 of the Constitution that gives to every person a fundamental right to freedom of conscience and free profession and practice of religion. The School defended its rules on the basis of Article 30 of the Constitution that gives to all minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions. The expulsion was challenged unsuccessfully before the High Court and the matter finally came to the Supreme Court. On 30 March 2009 the petition was dismissed in limine but in course of the brief hearing one of the judges made certain observations that were widely reported in the media.

The judge said:

“We don’t want to have Talibans in the country. Tomorrow a girl student may come and say that she wants to wear a burqa, can we allow it?”

He further said:

“I am secularist. We should strike a balance between rights and personal beliefs. We cannot overstretch secularism."

“You can join some other institution if you do not want to observe the rules. But you can’t ask the school to change the rules for you”

The remarks created an uproar. The outrage among the Muslims was not against the dismissal of the case but against the remarks calling the beard and the burqa as the marker of the Taliban. Then, something very unusual happened. On 6 July 2009, on a review petition challenging the previous order, the Bench recalled its order dismissing the petition and requested the Chief Justice to have the case placed before a new Bench. On 11 September 2009 the case was heard by the new Bench constituted for the purpose, and this time the response of the Court was completely different. The Court not only issued notice to the school authorities but gave an ex-parte interim direction to the school to reinstate the expelled student and to allow him to pursue his studies there. The Court also made some observations in course of hearing that were reported in the media.

The Court said:

“How on earth could a school disentitle a student from pursuing studies just because he has kept a beard? Then there will be no end to such prima facie ridiculous rules.”

“So if you are a Sikh, you will not be able to sport a beard. Tomorrow they will say you are not fair complexioned (and will remove you)”

“Nowadays, it has become a fashion for some people to pierce their ears. So such persons will not be allowed to study?”

This single case seems to exemplify the difficulties faced by the Court in dealing with two competing constitutional rights. The first Bench obviously gave precedence to the group right guaranteed by the Constitution to a religious minority, in this case the Christian management of the school. The second Bench, on the other hand, deemed fit, in the context of the case, to uphold the right of the individual, the Muslim boy. This deep dilemma seems to run through the decisions of the Supreme Court on the issue of cultural and educational rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the religious minorities.

5 Latin maxim meaning “at the threshold”
6 No Talibanization of India says SC, Court rejects student’s plea to keep beard, the Times of India , 31 March 2009 (P. 13).
7 Id.
8 A decision of the court in the absence of or without reference to the second party concerned in the case.
9 Ridiculous to expel student with beard; SC, Times of India (p.9) on 12 September 2009
10 Expelling student over beard ridiculous; SC, The Indian Express (p.2) on 12 September 2009
11 Id.
I Pluralism and Minority Rights

In 1957, barely ten years after independence, the first elected Communist government of the State of Kerala, took steps to enact a law bringing the school education in the State under its extensive control. A number of Christian organizations managing a vast network of schools in the State for a very long time and, also, some Muslim groups opposed the government’s move and their agitation threatened to create a political crisis. In that situation the President of India, to whom the Bill had come for his assent, made a reference to the Supreme Court seeking its advice on the constitutional validity of a number of provisions in the Bill. The reference was heard by a Constitution bench of seven Judges, headed by Chief Justice S. R. Das.

In dealing with the Presidential Reference, the Supreme Court gave a very expansive interpretation of the right under Article 30. It held that the right under Article 30 was not restricted only to institutions set up for conservation and promotion of culture, language or religion. A religious minority could establish and administer an educational institution of any kind depending upon its “choice.” In exercise of the right guaranteed under Article 30, a minority community was free to set up a primary school as well as an institution of higher education teaching Arts, Social Sciences, Natural Sciences or even professional courses.

The Court further held that Article 30 was a stand-alone Article and the right guaranteed to the minorities under it was not controlled either by Article 29 or any other Article in the chapter of Fundamental rights or even Article 45 in the chapter of Directive Principles relating to education to children below the age of six years.

Speaking for the Court Chief Justice S. R. Das said:

“So long as the Constitution stands as it is and is not altered, it is, we conceive, the duty of this Court to uphold the fundamental rights and thereby honour our sacred obligation to the minority communities who are of our own.”

The decision in the case of In Re. The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, however, was not unanimous. There was at least one dissenting voice (of T. L. Venkatarama Aiyar, J.). He took the view that Article 30 was primarily intended to protect educational institutions established for the conservation and promotion of the culture, language or religion of a minority group. Aiyar J. held that Article 30 created a purely negative obligation on the State and prevented it from interfering with minorities living their own cultural life as regards religion or language.

Aiyer J. observed:

“Now, to compel the State to recognise those institutions would conflict with the fundamental concept on which the Constitution is framed that the State should be secular in character.”

The two views directly opposing each other and both relying upon the principles of secularism that were manifested in In Re. The Kerala Education Bill appear to run through the decisions of the Supreme Court on all aspects of secularism.

For about the next thirty five years, however, with the sole exception in the case of Aligarh Muslim University, the majority decision in Re. Kerala Education Bill was by far the dominant view on the issue of the rights of the religious minority. The Court went on expanding the scope of the right under Article 30 and five years later in Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai vs. State of Bombay a six judges Bench went on to hold that:

“Unlike Article 19, the fundamental freedom under Article 30(1) is absolute in terms; it is not made subject to any reasonable restrictions of the nature the fundamental freedoms enunciated in Article 19 may be subjected to.” (Emphasis added)

12 The Kerala Education Act, 1957
13 In Azeez Basha vs. Union of India; AIR 1968 SC 662 the Supreme Court held, contrary to the common belief, that the Aligarh Muslim University was not a minority institution because it could not be said to have been established by the Muslim Community (the University was set up by the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920, passed by the Governor-General’s Legislative Council). The judgment attracted widespread criticism from constitutional commentators. See Seervai’s Constitutional Law of India, fourth edition, Vol. II, pages 1319-1324.
14 AIR 1963 SC 540 – The Gujarat and Kathiawar Presbyterian Joint Board belonging to the United Church of Northern India managed forty two schools and one training college. The Government of Bombay issued an order requiring all private training colleges to reserve 80% of their seats for government nominees. The Supreme Court held this was a clear violation of the rights of minority institutions guaranteed them under Article 30(1).
In the following years the Court mostly dealt with cases in which specific regulations sought to be enforced by the State came under challenge and examined how far those regulations could be said to ensure academic excellence and how far those tended to interfere with the right guaranteed under Article 30.

In 1974 came the case of St. Xavier College, Ahmedabad. The decision in St. Xavier College made a resounding reiteration of the Court’s position on the question of minority rights. It reaffirmed the decisions in Re. Kerala Education Bill and other earlier cases and in some respects expanded the scope of Article 30 even further.

Five years later in Lilly Kurian vs. Sr. Lewina, A. P. Sen J. observed:

“Protection of the minorities is an Article of faith in the Constitution of India”.

The first sign of the turn around came about thirty five years after the decision in In Re. The Kerala Education Bill in 1992 in the case of St. Stephen’s College. But before going to St. Stephen’s College I may just mention some developments that firmly established secularism in the Indian jurisprudence, albeit in a general, undefined way.

15 Rev. Father W. Proost and others vs. The State of Bihar and others. AIR 1969 SC 465: Date of judgment, 13 September, 1968 (Five Judges’ bench) – Holding that the right guaranteed under Article 30 (1) to minorities to establish and administer educational institutions is wider than, independent of, and unconstrained by the right of minorities under Article 29(1) to conserve their distinct language, script and culture, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Bihar Universities Act, 1948, which took away autonomy of the governing body of a minority institution in matters of appointments, dismissals, reduction in rank and disciplinary matters and vested it in the University Service Commission, as violative of the right under Article 30(1). The mere fact that a minority institution also accepts students from non-minority communities does not detract from the minority character of the institution.

Rt. Rev. Bishop S. K. Patro vs. State of Bihar and others, (1969) 1 SCC 863: Date of judgment, 2 April, 1969 (Five Judges’ bench) – The Bihar High Schools (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960 enabled the state government to frame rules for the eponymous purpose, but exempted minority institutions from their purview. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Church Missionary Society Higher Secondary School, Bhagalpur was a non-minority institution because it was established by the Church Missionary Society, London (having therefore an alien domicile) before the commencement of the Constitution. The Court held that the protection of Article 30 is equally available to institutions founded before and after the commencement of the Constitution. Further, while Article 29 expressly makes citizenship a ground for availing the right under it, Article 30 does not expressly refer to citizenship as a qualification for members of a minority to establish and administer an educational institution. The institution in question, though funded by the London Society was established and maintained with considerable involvement from local members of the community in Bhagalpur and as such fulfils the sufficient condition for minority status.

State of Kerala, etc. vs. Very Rev. Mother Provincial etc., (1970) 2 SCC 417: Date of judgment, 10 August, 1970 (Six Judges’ bench) – The provisions of the Kerala University Act, 1969, inter alia, required the setting up of a governing body/ managing council for a private college/group of private colleges under corporate management for the administration of the college(s). The Court struck down the said provisions, in so far as they related to minority institutions, on the ground that vesting complete control over the management and administration of minority institutions in bodies drawing their mandate from the University, and denying the founders and the minority community any role in the same, was violative of the rights guaranteed under Article 30.

D. A. V. College, Bhatinda, Etc. vs. The State Of Punjab And Others, (1971) 2 SCC 261: Date Of Judgment, 5 May, 1971 (Five Judges’ Bench) – The Dayanand Anglo Vedic College is an educational institution set up to promote the memory of the founder of the Arya Samaj and is a minority institution. The Guru Nanak University (Amritsar) Act, 1969 inter alia provided for (i) the study and research on the life and teachings of Guru Nanak and their cultural/ religious impact on Indian and world civilization and research in Punjabi language and literature; (ii) compulsory affiliation of colleges; (iii) conditions governing service and conduct of teachers in affiliated institutions; and (iv) the constitution and composition of governing bodies in affiliated colleges, and control over appointments in such institutions. The Supreme Court held that the control stipulated in the last category was in violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 30 but that the first three categories of provisions in the Act were not in violation of minority rights. Conditions regarding service and conduct of staff were not per se in violation of Article 30 and their actual purpose and import needed to be examined to demonstrate the manner in which it was likely to affect the administration of the institution.

Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717 – The Gujarat University Act, 1949 authorised the University to undertake teaching in undergraduate colleges affiliated to it, and further declared them constituent colleges thereby integrating them with the University and bringing them within the purview of statutes made in that behalf. The Supreme Court held these provisions to constitute a clear infringement of the right of minority institutions to establish and administer them under Article 30(1).

17 (1979) 2 SCC 124. Under the Kerala University Act, 1969 and the ordinances made thereunder, the power to take disciplinary action against a teacher was vested in the management of the institution, but the teacher concerned could appeal the decision to the Vice-Chancellor of the University granting affiliation to the institution. The Supreme Court held that the right under Article 30(1) did not extend to the maladministration of a minority institution, and state regulation was permissible. However, where such regulation impaired the right of the institution to administer itself, it is violative of Article 30(1).

18 St. Stephen’s College vs. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558
In *Kesavananda Bharati*23 (1973) the Supreme Court said that the Constitution has certain ‘fundamental features’ constituting ‘its basic structure’, the core that was beyond the amending powers of the Parliament. Secularism was cited as one such basic feature. Two years later (1975) in the case concerning the election of *Indira Nehru Gandhi*24 the Court said that secularism was inalienable from the Constitution and the polity established under it. In those two cases the Court did not elaborate on the nature of secularism as there was no occasion for it. But from the one or two sentences in the two judgments (Shelat and Grover JJ. in *Kesavananda Bharati* and Chandrachud J. in *Indira Nehru Gandhi*) it appears that the Court was referring, in the abstract, to the first principles of western secularism that prohibit the State to have any religion of its own and give the individual the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.

After *Kesavananda Bharati* and *Indira Nehru Gandhi* the Supreme Court reiterated in a number of decisions that secularism is a basic feature and a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution and it could not be in any way undermined either by any legislative enactment or by any executive action. The observations concerning secularism are made in vastly different contexts and sometimes seem to convey different meanings of secularism. Here I do not propose to refer to each such decision. Suffice to note here that this line of decisions reached its high point in *Bommai’s*25 case.

In *Bommai* the Court was called upon to consider the constitutional validity of the presidential proclamations issued under Article 35623 of the Constitution dismissing the governments of several States. Among the States hit by the presidential proclamation were Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. The reports of the Governors of the three States, that formed the constitutional basis for the Presidential Proclamation, *inter alia* stated that the governments of those States had extended active overt and covert support to communal organizations and individuals, greatly aiding them in the demolition of the Babri Masjid, the medieval mosque in the North Indian Town, Ayodhya23. After the demolition, the three State Governments made no secret of their abetment in the act but on the contrary took pride in the fact in their public utterances. According to the Governors’ reports, the constitutional machinery in those States had failed. But the undeniable fact was that each of the three dismissed governments enjoyed clear majority in their respective Assemblies. The presidential proclamation was, therefore, assailed as an attack on democracy.

But the Court was firm and unyielding in the defence of secularism. Seven out of the nine Judges24 constituting the Bench resolutely reiterated the view that secularism was the basic feature of the Constitution and in case a State Government acted contrary to the constitutional mandate of secularism or, worse still, directly or indirectly, subverted the secular principles, that would be tantamount to failure of the constitutional machinery and the State Government would make itself...
liable to dismissal under Article 356. Reddy J. (writing for himself and Agrawal J. and with whom Pandian J. concurred) appears absolutely non-compromising on the issue of secularism.25

Around the same time as the Court was engaged in salvaging secularism from the debris of the demolished medieval mosque, it also started to see the interplay between community based rights and individual rights in a new light. St. Stephen’s College, Delhi, a Christian minority institution, is one of the finest colleges in the country. Its great reputation and academic excellence makes it one of the most sought after colleges in north India. Every seat in the various under graduate courses counts for admission. In the case of St. Stephen’s College26 the Court, for the first time deviating from the decision in Re. Kerala Education Bill, held that it was not open to a government aided minority institution to deny admission to students of other communities or to devise a selection process so as to exclude students from other communities. Such a course would violate Article 29(2) of the Constitution that mandates that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on ground only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. The Court felt the need to strike a balance between an individual’s right based on merits and the right of minorities to set-up and administer educational institutions of their choice and directed that St. Stephen’s College could have no more than fifty percent seats reserved for Christian students. Thus, the right under Article 30 was for the first time subject to Article 29.27 However, within this fifty percent, the minority institution is entitled to give concessions to students belonging to its own community and to devise such selection criteria as are necessary to ensure the same.

Finally a trilogy of decisions rendered between 2003 and 2005 brought about a complete change in the way the Supreme Court looked at the right of the religious minority to establish an educational institution guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution.

In 2003 the socio-economic and political conditions in India were not the same as in 1958 when the Court had given its opinion on the Kerala Education Bill. In a recent interview Professor Amartya Sen28 stated that in 1991-92 the Indian State was over-extended in certain areas and under-extended in some areas like education and healthcare. The vacant space in the two areas was filled up by private investors. A large number of private colleges, teaching professional and job oriented courses came up in different parts of the country. Admission in these colleges was taken without much regard to merit and mostly on payment of large amounts as ‘donation’/capitation fee. This development, on the one hand, had caused much distortion in the system of higher/professional education in the country and on the other hand there was growing pressure from the private investors in the area of education to gain legitimacy. In 1993 it was contended before the Supreme Court29 that imparting education or teaching was like any other occupation, trade or business and could be carried on as such under the protection of Article 19(1)(g)30 of the Constitution. The Court firmly

25 Reddy J. observed: “Secularism is one of the basic features of the Constitution. While freedom of religion is guaranteed to all persons in India, from the point of view of the State, the religion, faith or belief of a person is immaterial. To the State, all are equal and are entitled to be treated equally. In matters of State, religion has no place. No political party can simultaneously be a religious party. Politics and religion cannot be mixed. Any State Government which pursues unsecular policies or unsecular course of action acts contrary to the Constitutional mandate and renders itself amendable to action under Article 356. This (secularism) may be a concept evolved by western liberal thought or it may be, as some say, an abiding faith with the Indian people at all points of time. That is not material. What is material is that it is a constitutional goal and a basic feature of the Constitution. Any step inconsistent with this constitutional policy is, in plain words, unconstitutional.” He went farther and observed that not only the state but even a political party could not pursue a non secular agenda. He said:

“If any party or organization seeks to fight the elections on the basis of a plank which has the proximate effect of eroding the secular philosophy of the Constitution (it) would certainly be guilty of following an unconstitutional course of action. Political parties are formed and exist to capture or share State power…. If the Constitution requires the State to be secular in thought and action, the same requirement attaches to political parties as well. The Constitution does not recognize, it does not permit, mixing religion and State power. Both must be kept apart. That is the constitutional injunction. None can say otherwise so long as this Constitution governs this country. Introducing religion into politics is to introduce an impermissible element into body politics and an imbalance in our constitutional system…. The fact that a party may be entitled to go to people seeking mandate for a drastic amendment of the Constitution or its replacement by another Constitution is wholly irrelevant in the context. Constitution cannot be amended so as to remove secularism from the basic structure of the Constitution. Nor the present Constitution can be replaced by another; it is enough to say that the Constitution does not provide for such a course – that it does not provide for its own demise.”

26 Supra note 23.
27 See Annexure
28 Outlook, 17 August, 2009.
30 Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution: Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.-
(1) All citizens shall have the right-
(g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
rejected the argument holding that in India imparting education was a noble pursuit, a piety, a charity. It held that it was obligatory for the State to provide free and compulsory education to children of the age of six to fourteen years, for it was the child’s fundamental right, being a part of right to life guaranteed by Article 21\(^{31}\) of the Constitution. The Court also prohibited capitation fee by any name whatsoever and held that private educational institutions are in the nature of a supplement to the main educational activity of the state and as such are co-equally compelled under Article 14 (the Constitutional provision guaranteeing equality before law) to admit students on merit. The Court devised a Scheme for admission into private professional colleges (that sought recognition/affiliation from the state) with a view to eliminating discretion of the management altogether in admissions. The Scheme stipulated that fifty percent of seats (to be known as ‘free’ seats) in every professional college were to be filled by nominees of the Government or University on the basis of merit. The remaining fifty percent of seats (to be known as ‘payment’ seats were to be filled on the basis of inter se merit among students who are willing to pay a higher fee as stipulated by the management but within the ceiling prescribed by the state. No quota could be reserved from among the payment seats for management, or for any family, caste, community which may have established such college. A question then arose how the two decisions, in \textit{St. Stephen’s College} and in \textit{Unni Krishnan}\(^{32}\) would work out in the case of minority institutions. A minority organization, called the Islamic Academy of Education, brought the issue to the Supreme Court and its case was referred to the larger bench. Here a number of non-minority private colleges also joined issue. They were mainly interested in getting the \textit{Unni Krishnan} scheme of admission undone. Ultimately \textit{Islamic Academy} was relegated to the back and \textit{Pai}\(^{33}\) a non minority private college, came to the fore.

\textit{Pai} was heard by a bench of eleven judges so that the Court may not be bound by any of its earlier judgments. In \textit{Pai} it was for the first time the question of minority rights was not considered independently and it got mixed up with cases of non minority private colleges. The decision in \textit{Pai} is very heavy on secular rhetoric but at the end of the judgment the minority rights appear to be considerably restricted in comparison to their earlier position. \textit{Pai} blurred the line between a minority institution and a non minority private institution.

Within less than a year another Constitution Bench took up the case of \textit{Islamic Academy}\(^{34}\) in order to clear the doubts and anomalies arising from the \textit{Pai} decision and two years thereafter another seven-judge Bench of the Supreme Court assembled to hear the case of \textit{Inamdar}\(^{35}\) to clear the confusion arising from \textit{Pai} and \textit{Islamic Academy}. At the end of the exercise Article 30 all but lost its independent identity.

\textbf{The position that emerges from the three decisions may be summarized thus:}

Article 30 does not give to the religious minorities any additional or separate right. The religious minority has no special right that the majority does not have under the Constitution.

Articles 29 and 30 do not confer any rights but afford certain protections to the minorities. The two Articles can be better understood as a protection and/or a privilege of the minority rather than an abstract right. (View of Venkatarama J. in minority of 1:6 in \textit{Re. Kerala Education Bill resurrected})

The right under Article 30 is not absolute. It is subject to Article 29(2) and other laws. It can be restricted in public interest and national interest. (\textit{Sidhajbhai Sabhai} expressly overruled).

The decision in \textit{Inamdar} also laid down guidelines relating to the manner of admission and composition of students that render the minority status of an institution quite precarious.

It also needs to be pointed out that the three decisions indeed brought about a basic shift in the

\(^{31}\) Article 21 of the Constitution: Protection of life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

\(^{32}\) (1993) 1 SCC 645

\(^{33}\) TMA Pai Foundation \textit{vs. State of Karnataka}; (2002) 8 SCC 481

\(^{34}\) \textit{Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Karnataka}; (2003) 6 SCC 697

\(^{35}\) \textit{PA Inamdar vs. State of Maharashtra}; (2005) 6 SCC 537
Court’s position in regard to the right of the religious minority to establish educational institutions but the greater and equally significant shift was towards privatisation of education.

To sum up, for about forty to forty five years the Supreme Court held that though the Constitution did not permit community specific political rights, it recognised community specific social rights. But in the last fifteen years the court seems to have come to the view that under the Constitution there cannot be any community specific rights, either political or social.

II Ascendency of the Monoculturist View

The Court’s decisions in the last fifteen years show the tendency to see Indian secularism more from a mono-culturist rather than a pluralist point of view. In 1994, in Bommai, Reddy J. speaking for himself and two other judges of the Court said,

“If the Constitution requires the State to be secular in thought and action, the same requirement attaches to political parties as well” because, “political parties are formed and exist to capture or share State power.”

Barely two years later the Court had before it four appeals in which the Bombay High Court had voided the elections of the winning candidates for indulging in “corrupt practice” by making appeals for votes in the name of religion. The Supreme Court dismissed one of the appeals (on behalf of Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabho) but allowed the other three appeals restoring the elections of the three appellants. The four decisions, commonly referred to collectively as the ‘Hindutva Decisions’ are highly significant and among them the most important one is in the case of Manohar Joshi.

In his election speeches Manohar Joshi, the winning candidate had said that

“[T]he first Hindu State will be established in Maharashtra”, one of the States of India. The court, studiously avoiding any reference to the seven-judge bench decision in Bommai, set-aside the decision of the High Court and restored the appellant’s election observing that “a mere statement that the first Hindu State will be established in Maharashtra is by itself not an appeal for votes on the ground of his religion but the expression, at best, of such a hope.”

The Court went much further and using the words “Hindu”, “Hinduism” and “Hindutva” interchangeably observed that those terms were not amenable to any precise definition and no meaning in the abstract would confine the term “Hindutva” to the narrow limits of religion alone. The Court further observed

“[T]he term ‘Hindutva’ is related more to the way of life of the people in the sub-continent. It is difficult to appreciate how in the face of [prior rulings] the term ‘Hindutva’ or ‘Hinduism’ per se, in the abstract can be assumed to mean and be equated with narrow fundamentalist Hindu religious bigotry....”

It may be recalled here that Dr. Radhakrishnan in his famous (1926) Upton lectures had characterized Hinduism as a “way of life” rather than a religion based on dogma. This description of Hinduism was extensively used by the Court earlier in the temple entry case in which the Court had intervened firmly in support of the Dalits’ entry into Hindu temples. The Court had tried to reconcile the Hindu ‘way of life’ with the democratic way of life envisaged under the Constitution with social justice as one of its cornerstones. The Hindutva decisions appropriated the approach and the reasoning of the temple entry decision but for an object entirely different from the earlier case.

The Hindutva decisions came under severe criticism for conflating “Hindutva” with Hinduism and thus trying to purge it of all elements antithetical to secularism. But at the same time those decisions were greatly applauded by the supporters of free speech and democratic liberalism.

The Hindutva decisions seem to have inspired the Court to take the mono-culturist view of secularism in a series of later decisions some of which are presented here.

...
In 2002 a PIL (Public Interest Litigation) was filed questioning the Curriculum for School Education framed by the National Council for Educational Research and Training on the ground that it was heavily loaded with religion and the contents of the Vedas. It was contended that the inclusion of religion, Sanskrit, Vedic Mathematics, Vedic Astrology etc. in the courses of study for the schools was contrary to secular principles. The curriculum prepared by the NCERT, was, therefore, bad as it offended one of the fundamental features of the Constitution. Dharmadhikari J. one of the members of the three-judge Bench wrote a separate, though concurring judgment in which he discussed in some detail about the true nature of secularism. He observed that the doctrine of the State’s neutrality towards all religions was a narrow concept of secularism. He further observed that, the policy of complete neutrality towards religion and apathy for all kinds of religious teachings in institutions of the State had not done any good to the country. The real meaning of secularism in the language of Gandhi is “sarva dharma samabhav” meaning equal treatment and respect for all religions, but we misunderstood the meaning of secularism as negation of all religions”. In the Aruna Roy case the Court upheld the constitutional validity of the national curriculum overlooking the fact that what was included in the curriculum was not religious teachings of all kinds but only of one particular kind. It also unfolded, on the authority of Gandhi, a view of secularism that one would find it very difficult to reconcile with Gandhi’s idea on religion and State.

In Aruna Roy the Court held that though the curriculum mentioned the subject as ‘Vedic Astrology’ its contents were actually in the nature of ‘Vedic Astronomy’ and hence, its inclusion in the school course was not unjustified. Two years later it upheld the teaching of Vedic Astrology (Jyotir Vigyan) too as graduate and post-graduate (B.Sc. and M.Sc.) courses in different universities. The Court did not accept the submission that the prescription of Jyotir Vigyan as a course of study had the effect of “saffronising” education or that it in any manner militated against the concept of secularism which is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and is essential for the governance of the country.

In 2005 an organisation representing a section of the Jain community approached the Court seeking a direction to the Central Government to notify “Jains” as a minority community. The Court not only firmly rejected the prayer but also expressed its strong disapproval of the very concept of ‘minority’. Calling it a baggage from India’s history, the Court noted, “Muslims constituted the largest religious minority because the Mughal period of rule was the longest followed by the British Rule during which many Indians had adopted Muslim and Christian religions…” It further observed that the concept of “minorities” was the result of the British policy of divide and rule that first led to the formation of separate electorates and reservations of seats on the basis of population of Hindus and Muslims and finally led to the partition of India and formation of a separate Muslim State of Pakistan. The Court pointed out that India was a democratic republic which had adopted the right to equality as its fundamental creed and hence, the Constitutional ideal should be the elimination of “minority” and “majority” and the so called forward and backward classes.

III Dilemmas of Reformist Interpretations

Coming now to the third and the last part of the paper we will see how the Court has tried to regulate the efforts of the State to control religious affairs in the context of Article 26 of the Constitution. Article 26 gives to every religious denomination or any section thereof the freedom to manage its religious affairs, subject, however to considerations of public order, morality and health. In order to determine the extent of the right the Supreme Court in its earliest days evolved the essential practices test according to which immunity from State intervention was available to only such practices that were integral to the faith and not to other practices pertaining to economic and commercial matters though associated with religion. The interesting point to note is that the court preferred to lay down the ‘essential practices’ test, rather than simply subjecting the law to the test of public order, morality and health (to which rights under Articles 25 and 26 are subjected to). So, instead of denying constitutional protection on the ground that a certain practice violated public order, morality or health, all secular standards, the court preferred to hold that that certain practice was not an essential part of the particular religion. The Court also arrogated to itself the right to decide whether or not a certain practice was essential to a religion, of course with reference to authoritative sources and texts relating to that religion. Later on, in the Durgah Committee case the Court held that Articles 25 and 26 were intended to protect existing rights and they did not confer any new rights. In the Durgah Committee case the Court took a step further and held that religious practices might have sprung from superstitious beliefs that are “extraneous and unessential assertions” to the religion. Such practices would naturally have no immunity against State intervention.
The essential practices test, in application, led to both socially negative and positive results. In Saifuddin Saheb the Court upheld the authority of the Dai-ul-Mutlaq, the spiritual and temporal head of the Dawoodi Bohra community, to excommunicate on the ground that such power was an ‘essential religious practice’. Similarly, in the case of Harry Stainislaus the Court held that the right to propagate one’s religion, protected by the Constitution, does not include the right to proselytise.

On the positive side, there is a very notable case concerning the entry of Harijans into Hindu temples. Some people of Swaminarayana sect took the plea that they did not belong to the Hindu religion and hence their temples were not covered by the Act prohibiting Hindu temples from refusing entry to Harijans. The Court referred to several texts on Hinduism and Indology and concluded that the Swaminarayana Sect was part of the Hindu religion, and their temples were fully covered by the provisions of the Act.

As can be seen, the Court’s approach, at least in its early days, was shaped by the desire to reform and reshape certain religious practices. It, therefore, consciously gave itself the power to judge what was an essential practice of a religion - those that were not essential practices could not avail of the protection of Article 25. This led the Court to adopt an extremely interventionist approach – often even resorting to scriptural interpretation.

Apart from the reformist explanation, one may also attribute the interventionist position of Courts to the fact that in a country like India, it is easier to say something is not essentially religious than to say that religion is against public order. This may be another reason why Courts have generally preferred the essential practices test as compared to subjecting religious freedom to secular public order restrictions.

The inherent limitation and danger in this approach to the construction and interpretation of constitutional rights was exposed in the Anand Margis case and more severely in the case of Shah Bano, one of the most controversial decisions by the Court involving religion. In Shah Bano the question before the Court was whether the statutory provisions of maintenance of divorced wives were applicable to Muslims, in view of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. The Court held that there was nothing in Muslim Personal Law that conflicted with the statutory provisions for maintenance. But the Court arrived at its conclusion by beginning the judgment with a Hadith of doubtful veracity and proceeding with the observation “there can be no greater authority on this question than the holy Quran”.

The decision came under a lot of criticism and there was great resentment against the Court arrogating to itself the right and the authority to interpret the Quran, forgetting that the Court had consistently resorted to scriptural interpretation while applying the essential practices test to the Hindu Religion.

For political considerations the Central Government codified the law on Muslim wives’ right to maintenance and Parliament enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The new Act was challenged in Danial Latifi case as violative of the constitutional right of the Muslim woman to obtain statutory maintenance beyond the iddat period, which had been upheld in Shah Bano. The Court, while upholding the constitutional validity of the Act was also able to preserve all the rights given to a Muslim divorcee woman in the Shah Bano case, triumphantly observing that “it may look ironical that the enactment intended to reverse the decision in Shah Bano’s case, actually codifies the very rationale contained therein”.

What, however, is of great significance is that in Danial Latifi, the Court reached the same reformist conclusion as in Shah Bano - but through a different, and more acceptable, route. The Court subjected the Act to the test of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution, and concluded that the Act did not offend the principles contained in these Articles. It effectively held that the Act would be unconstitutional if interpreted to give Muslim women less than other women by way of maintenance.

IV Striking Balance between group identities and individual rights

In conclusion, I would say that on the issue of community based rights or minority rights the Court will have to find a middle ground between its two extreme positions, one where the right was held to be absolute and not subject to any reasonable restrictions even in public interest or national interest and the other where the right stands emasculated. An over-emphasis on community specific rights does not seem to do any good to anyone, not even to the minority groups. It is argued that it only serves to strengthen the walls separating the minority from the majority and acts as a barrier for the members of the minority community to join the national main stream education and the avenues that open up from there. Far more important, it is contended that the Court in its earlier reading of the minority
rights treated the minorities as monolithic blocks and thereby gave the elite within the minority groups complete control over those rights. In India minority groups are as hierarchical as the larger Indian society. It is pointed out that social surveys show that an over protection of community specific rights was of very little, if hardly any, use to the weaker sections within the minority groups. But on the other hand a complete denial of community based rights evokes within the minority groups the fear of being subsumed by the majority and that is a source of social tension on a greater scale. Therefore, issues of minority rights perhaps needs to be addressed afresh having regard to these concerns and in light of the experience of the past sixty years.

As to the nature of Indian secularism and the role of the State in matters of religion, I am of the view that in India secularism can only be viewed in a broad, expansive way that has in it a place for every community and group. Indian secularism, like the civic body in India has to be inherently pluralistic and flexible. In India secularism cannot be seen or used as a means for doing away with all the differences of creed and caste and region and language and for developing a more homogenised society laying undue stress on ‘Indianness’. A position where the idea of secularism is applied to make all the religious and linguistic minority groups and the tribals and the Dalits within the Hindu fold to lose not only their identities but also their national aspirations would, to my mind, negate not only what the Constitution of India stands for but also what Gandhi stood for.

The role and the responsibility of the courts thus lies in constantly balancing these competing interests of diverse groups in such a way that it strengthens the value kernel that dynamically represents a secular and democratic India.
ANNEXURE: Constitution of India

Article 15
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to-
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained whole or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of general public.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) or article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the state from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in Clause (1) of Article 30.

Article 25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law-
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
Explanation I.- The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.
Explanation II.- In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.

Article 26. Freedom to manage religious affairs
Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right—
(c) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(d) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(e) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(f) to administer such property in accordance with law.

Article 27. Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion
No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.

Article 28. Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions.
(1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution which is administered by the State but has been established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institution.
(3) No person attending any educational institution recognised by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such
institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto.

Cultural and Educational Rights

Article 29. Protection of interests of minorities
(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.

Article 30. Right of minorities to establish an administered educational institutions
(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
(1A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of any institutional institution established by and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause].…. (inserted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, with effect from June 20, 1979)
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.